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JPRS-USA-85-002

13 March 1985

USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

19990514 130

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

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13 March 1985

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

K. U. Chernenko Responds to WASHINGTON POST's Questions (pp 3-5) (not translated)	
Evolution of Washington's Military-Strategic Concepts (pp 6-15) (M. A. Mil'shteyn).....	1
Trends in Efficiency of Fixed Capital (pp 16-28) (A. I. Izyumov) (not translated)	
Two Educational Reforms (pp 29-37) (Z. A. Mal'kova) (not translated)	
USSR and USA in World War II (pp 38-51) (B. R. Izakov) (not translated)	
U.S. Said Uninterested in Nuclear Nonproliferation (pp 52-56) (V. F. Davydov).....	13
U.S. Attitude at Geneva Disarmament Conference Assailed (pp 56-61) (V. I. Baburov).....	19
Soviet-American Trade Today (pp 61-68) (O. Ye. Tishchenko).....	25
U.S. Blamed for Impeding Cultural Ties with USSR (pp 68-74) (G. P. Dobrosel'skaya).....	34
State of Affairs in American Ferrous Metallurgy (pp 75-84) (A. F. Myrtsyomov) (not translated)	

CONTENTS (Continued)

98th Congress: Debates on Armaments (pp 85-89) (V. I. Batyuk).....	41
America in Search of Itself (pp 90-95) (Theodore White) (not translated)	
Space Piloted Station Project (pp 96-103) (G. S. Khozin).....	48
Milk Distribution and Processing (pp 104-112) (A. A. Tulupnikov) (not translated)	
Book Reviews	
SIPRI Publication on Dangers of Arms Race Reviewed (pp 113-116) (V. F. Davydov).....	57
Review of 'Weapons and Hope' by F. Dyson (pp 116-118) (A. A. Lebedeva) (not translated)	
Review of 'Consequences of Party Reform' by Nelson W. Polsby (pp 118-120) (A. N. Darchiyev) (not translated)	
Enterprise Zones (pp 121-127) (A. A. Kuteynikov) (not translated)	

PUBLICATION DATA

English title : USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 11, November 1984

Russian title : SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : V. M. Berezhkov

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo Nauka

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : November 1984

Signed to press : 18 October 1984

Copies : 29,500

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politika, ideologiya", 1984

EVOLUTION OF WASHINGTON'S MILITARY-STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 84
(signed to press 18 Oct 84) pp 6-15

[Article by M. A. Mil'shteyn; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] How is one to explain the fact that from time to time U.S. ruling circles are forced to renounce former military-strategic concepts or introduce essential amendments and alterations to them and proclaim new ones? In other words, what are the reasons for their evolution?

If it is a question of the political essence of U.S. military-strategic concepts, that is, that section which determines or implies their general direction and basic aim, for the sake of which a certain military-strategic concept is adopted, then one can say that no particular changes occur here. This section of military-strategic concepts is determined by the class and political essence of the state and its social nature. As is well-known, in this respect no changes take place in the United States, but if they do occur then it is in favor of still further increasing militarist and aggressive trends. "This is explained by the fact," K. U. Chernenko points out in his replies to questions from PRAVDA, "that, as before, the U.S. Administration is gambling on military strength, the gaining of military superiority and the imposition of its systems on other peoples.... In other words, the introduction of new words does not signify new policies."¹

The changes which are introduced to earlier military-strategic concepts primarily relate to means and methods of achieving set aims and to more precise definitions of their importance at a specific time.

American militarist and ruling circles constantly strive to perfect military-strategic concepts so that they ensure the most expedient usage of the latest military technology and the most perfected weapons in the interests of fulfilling their political aims, primarily in the struggle against the Soviet Union. It is true that the possibilities of developing such concepts are limited, in particular, by the constant clash of interests between different monopolist groups over the securing of large and profitable orders. They are also limited by the reactionary nature of the methodological and ideological-theoretical prerequisites which constitute the basis of these concepts. This

explains to a significant extent the unsound nature and existence of adventurist elements in many of them.

A ramified mechanism operates in the United States for developing military-strategic concepts which determine the nature of war, the methods of conducting it and the construction of the armed forces. This is directly connected with research into the development of international relations in both the immediate period and the foreseeable future.

It is no accident that, in addition to government institutions, various centers and institutes for the study of foreign and military policy are drawn into researching military problems and developing military-strategic concepts in the United States. As has already been noted, during the course of such research there is a clash of interest between different political and military-industrial circles, and also between certain sections of the armed forces, and conflicting approaches are adopted to determine the role and importance of military strength and its individual components under different conditions.

One should distinguish between the two types of U.S. military-strategic concepts. One type is open or, in other words, officially declared. The substance of these concepts is usually referred to in speeches by the President, the secretary of state and the secretary of defense, in congressional reports and in other documents. They are discussed in congressional committees, in the press and at various forums. These military-strategic concepts, as a rule, are given fine-sounding names (for example, "assured destruction," "counterforce" and "second strike") with which they enter life. They could be called theoretical or general military-strategic concepts if they really reflected in every case the real substance of officially adopted military-strategic concepts and their theoretical basis. In many cases, however, they merely serve to mask the second type of concept and are frequently intended to present U.S. military activity as reciprocal (hence the extensive use of defense terminology--"containment," "flexible response," "second" or "counter" strike, and so forth). Consequently, these military-strategic concepts should be termed DECLARATIVE rather than theoretical.

Military-strategic concepts of the second type can conditionally be termed OPERATIONAL, intended to fulfill the main principled aims set by U.S. ruling circles. Their substance is implemented in concrete military plans, in a list of targets, the distribution of concrete forces and means for striking these targets, the methods of using these forces and means, the system of interaction, the priority of targets, criteria for striking these targets, intelligence evaluations and so forth. In other words, they embody the real military-strategic views, plans, ideas and intentions of the U.S. political and military leadership regarding the nature of war, the methods of conducting it and the construction of the armed forces.

Experience has shown that the birth of the first type of U.S. military-strategic concepts was preceded by a highly complex and original process. During the first years after the appearance of nuclear weapons, these concepts usually originated not within the walls of the military departments or the State Department, or in the National Security Council, but in the heart

of the so-called think tanks. And this was no accident. It was believed that the creation of nuclear weapons and their further development and perfection had radically changed not only the very nature of war and the methods of conducting it, but also the approaches to the development of strategy, which has now become not simply military, but nuclear, strategy, with all of the resulting consequences.

Not only military knowledge and experience, but also extensive knowledge of physics and other laws have been required to develop an effective nuclear strategy and the general principles of military-strategic concepts aimed at interpreting and implementing this strategy. No one has had the experience of waging a nuclear war and no one can predict with accuracy the consequences of the concentrated use of nuclear weapons in a short space of time. Consequently, it is believed that specialists and scientists--mathematicians, physicists, chemists, astronomers and sociologists--are best prepared for jointly developing military-strategic concepts, especially as far as their theoretical substantiation is concerned.

Among the centers from which the military departments and the State Department drew their ideas during the first postwar years, prime mention should be given to the Institute for the Study of International Relations at Yale University, and also Chicago and Princeton Universities. At the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's, the Rand Corporation became such a center. It had been founded under Air Force auspices in 1946. It is still this kind of center today. During the 1960's and 1970's, Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Brookings Institution became the chief think tanks in addition to the Rand Corporation. Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology are also well-known as the chief suppliers of government personnel. One could say that by that time a distinct academic community had been formed, uniting physicists, mathematicians, sociologists and politicians who knew one another well, held joint symposiums and conferences, discussed important problems of military strategy and policy as a whole and recommended which objectives and targets it was best to strike on the territory of the Soviet Union in order to cause it the greatest possible damage, what kind of war and which methods were most advantageous to the United States, which strategic weapons should be obtained for this purpose and which should be primarily developed. It was a new, prestigious and materially well-supplied field of science. Government organs and various charitable funds did not begrudge means. At the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's, many scientists who had engaged in strategic research found themselves in high posts in the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council and the White House, and they were given the opportunity to test their theories in practice.

One of the founders of American nuclear strategy, B. Brodie, wrote: "Virtually all the main ideas and opinions regarding nuclear weapons and their usage have been put forward by civilian specialists and scientists.... In all of this the military have been consumers without any particular exception, preferring some ideas to others, but not exerting any influence on the development of these ideas."²

With the assumption of power by the Reagan Administration, all scientific organizations and institutions, and also research centers (with the exception of the Rand Corporation), which for years have traditionally played a leading role in the development of military-strategic concepts, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, were somewhat moved into the background and, to a certain extent, found themselves in the shade. They include the Brookings Institution, the international research centers at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a number of institutes at Columbia University and the New York Council on Foreign Relations.

Institutions and organizations such as the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, the American Enterprise Institute for Social Policy Studies and the Center for Strategic and International Research at Georgetown University have been moved into the foreground. One could also add the American Security Council in Culpepper (Virginia), where the extremely reactionary organization known as "Peace From a Position of Strength" arose, and the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis at Cambridge (Massachusetts), which prepared the proposals for the organization of the "rapid deployment force." In other words, the leading place has been occupied by institutes and institutions of the most rightwing, reactionary and anti-Soviet persuasions. All of them have considerable means at their disposal (for example, the annual budget of the American Enterprise Institute amounts to approximately 10 million dollars).³ The research works prepared by the aforementioned institutions and relating to military-political problems are used by the Reagan Administration as points of departure for substantiating its military policies.

This was not simply a matter of replacing some institutes with others. The main thing was the serious shift in ideological and political priorities and aims. A dominant position has been occupied by the centers and institutions which have always taken the stand of unashamed and uncompromising anti-Sovietism and anticommunism. The works of these institutions have claimed, and continue to claim, that it was possible and necessary to win the war in Vietnam, not even stopping at the use of nuclear weapons, and that detente brought dividends only to the Soviet Union, just as the concluded SALT agreements are advantageous only to the Soviet Union and are detrimental to the security of the United States. It is precisely these institutions, which were present at the birth of organizations such as the Committee on the Present Danger and Peace From a Position of Strength, that have supplied the Reagan Administration with personnel and have been drawn into the development of contemporary military-strategic concepts.

The military personnel who have taken up leading posts in the armed forces command and particularly in strategic planning have naturally not always been content with such sudden interference by civilian scientists in the military sphere. They have frequently adopted a critical attitude to their active role in the development of military-strategic concepts and to their stormy invasion in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's of a sphere in which the military has traditionally held complete sway. General T. White, former commander of the U.S. Air Force, wrote in 1963: "Possibly the most dangerous aspect of the development of American strategy today lies in the fact that our

military thinking is under the influence of so-called intellectuals. I do not think that many of these self-confident and arrogant professors, mathematicians and other theoreticians have a sufficient understanding and grounding for dealing with the enemy which opposes us."⁴

Another Air Force commander, Gen Le May, wrote in the preface to his book "America in Danger" 5 years later: "The military profession is beginning to be increasingly filled with scientists who consider themselves oracles of military strategy. No one gives these 'intellectuals' an argument, simply because experienced professional officers are forbidden to participate in open debates. As a result, nonprofessionals dominate the sphere of military strategy. Today's cabinet strategists, who write wordy accounts on military matters for a public greedy for military knowledge, can cause incalculable damage. The 'experts' on matters of which they have no experience propose strategies based more on hopes, desires and fears than on facts and well-founded opinions."⁵

As far as concrete operational-strategic preparations, lists of targets and plans for striking these targets are concerned, this is already mainly the function of the Joint Chief of Staff, the command of the corresponding branches of the armed forces and the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Here the chief role is played by professional military personnel. This section is strictly confidential--a limited number of people are permitted to become engaged in it and acquainted with it, it is not referred to out loud, openly written about or, as a rule, publicly discussed, and strategists drawn from among intellectuals act only in the capacity of advisers.

At the same time, an "information leak" even about these plans is occasionally permitted for definite purposes. Only now is the United States beginning the gradual declassification of certain documents concerning the planning of the use of nuclear weapons, mainly relating to the period at the end of the 1940's (that is, immediately after the war), and the 1950's and 1960's. Although these documents have not been completely declassified, as has already been mentioned,⁶ and sometimes relate to a period of more than 20 years ago, their study and analysis nevertheless make it possible to determine, to a certain extent, the general principles and mechanism of the development of this section of military-strategic concepts, the system of working out targets, the direction of these concepts and their evolution, as well as to compare, if possible, the declarative section of concepts with its practical implementation in concrete planning.⁷ Now, basing their opinions on published documents, American theoreticians state that there exists a great breach between declarative military policy and its practical expression in concrete military plans and, consequently, as they see it, the history of American military policy must be revised and rewritten.

This is what Australian expert on American strategy, Desmond Ball, writes: "In the majority of discussions on U.S. nuclear strategy, no attempt is made to differentiate between the essence of real policy in this sphere, that is, how the United States in fact plans to use nuclear weapons in the event of an exchange of nuclear strikes, and that rhetorical, declarative section of military policy, which is officially proclaimed and is intended for various

strategic and bureaucratic purposes, but which, in a number of cases, in no way reflects the true views of the government.... However, only by means of studying the appropriate plans can military theoreticians really begin to understand the real significance of the corresponding government statements."⁸

D. Ball's opinion reflects the ideas which are now widespread among those scientists in the West who seriously strive to understand and critically appraise American military-strategic concepts.

Until 1960, plans for the use of nuclear weapons were drawn up by different commands (Strategic Air Command, Air Force, Navy, Army and Marines) separately, by means of composing an independent list of targets and operational plans for nuclear strikes and subsequently coordinating them under the leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chief role in this respect was played by the Strategic Air Command (SAC). T. Gates, U.S. secretary of defense in 1959-60, reached the conclusion that the absence of a unified plan led to the duplication of plans for utilizing nuclear forces against the same objectives, as well as to a lack of coordination in the time and place of nuclear strikes. For example, in one case there were plans to strike 115 Soviet air fields and 40 industrial complexes in the Far East twice by different commands, and other objectives--even 3 times.⁹ With the development of nuclear weapons, the appearance of intercontinental means of delivering these weapons and the putting into service (in 1960) of nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles, the situation with regard to planning became even more complex.

In order to eliminate the aforementioned errors and shortcomings in planning, in August 1960 the Eisenhower Administration adopted a decision concerning the compilation of a common list of targets. Directions on the nature, aims and tasks of these two documents were formulated in a directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which was ratified by the secretary of defense under the title "National Policy on SELECTING and Striking Targets." This directive primarily required the destruction of the Soviet Union's nuclear potential, and also the elimination of its "main military and governmental administrative centers." In addition, it envisaged with 90 percent probability the destruction of at least half of the USSR's industrial installations. Then a combined staff was formed to plan the list of strategic targets and the striking of these targets under the leadership of the SAC, as well as representatives of the Navy, Army, Marines and Air Force, although more than 80 percent of the staff officers were from the SAC.

By the middle of December 1960 the first unified and integrated operational plan was complete. It was ratified and called SIOP-62, the "62" denoting the fact that it would come into force in 1962 (earlier plans would remain in operation until then). In addition, Plan-1A was drawn up, which was even more confidential than the general plan and envisaged a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries to prevent a "possible or planned invasion of Western Europe by Soviet armed forces." It envisaged the use of approximately 3,500 nuclear warheads in a short space of time, with a general capacity of approximately 8,000 megatons, calculated to kill 285 million Soviet and Chinese citizens and seriously wound another 40 million people. Counterstrike forces, control centers and up to 50 percent

of all industrial objectives and major populated areas were the main planned targets.

Judging by published documents, the aforementioned system of drawing up operational plans for the use of nuclear weapons and the main list of objectives has basically been preserved.

This testifies once again to the fact that a comprehensive evaluation of American military-strategic concepts cannot be made purely on the basis of an analysis of only those which are officially declared. One must also compare declared concepts with an analysis of the accessible operational plans and official documents, however few they may be, concerning the concrete planning of the selection of targets and the use of nuclear weapons against them.

What is the reason for the changes in U.S. military-strategic concepts and by what is it conditioned?

American authors answer these questions differently. Some explain that revision mainly takes place under the influence of various current international and military events in which U.S. interests are affected. In this respect, they primarily cite the example of the defeat of the U.S. military machine and U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, after which the introduction of changes in military-strategic concepts was required. Speculation on the lost war immediately became an important part of the Pentagon's arguments in favor of increased military appropriations and a means of pushing programs through Congress which had, until then, aroused serious objections and had not been approved.

At the same time, Washington tried to critically appraise, on the basis of its experience in the Vietnam war, the danger of its armed forces intervening in military operations on foreign territory for the purpose of keeping reactionary regimes in power. As a result, a new concept was adopted, which became a component of the "Nixon Doctrine," the latter demanding the restriction of direct participation by American armed forces personnel in such conflicts, the more extensive utilization of satellite armies for these purposes and the provision of these armies with the necessary American military equipment. But it was not long before the former evaluations of the Vietnam war were reviewed. This fact is attested to by events in Central American countries--El Salvador, Nicaragua and also Grenada.

The influence of the international situation can also be traced through the example of the United States' rejection of the concept of "two and a half wars" and the transition to the concept of "one and a half wars." The first was one of the most important U.S. military-strategic concepts of the 1960's and envisaged preparations for one big war against the USSR, one big war against China and another small war somewhere else in the world. The change in PRC policy has meant that, since 1970, the United States has begun to proceed from the necessity of preparing for "one and a half wars," that is, a big war against the USSR and "a limited armed conflict in any other region of the world."¹⁰

Therefore, there is no doubt that the international situation seriously influences U.S. military-strategic concepts.

Others believe that the need to revise military-strategic concepts stems from domestic factors, since it is precisely these that frequently cause a change in strategic priorities. Inflation, the deficit in the balance of payments, the energy crisis and unemployment, in their opinion, affect military appropriations and, consequently, military programs. A change in administrations is also included among the domestic factors. "Each administration," writes W. Van Cleave, "must have its own strategic rhetoric, although in reality there can be no possibility of introducing vital changes to military programs or to strategic tasks and functions."¹¹ Some believe that American military-strategic concepts are dependent in many ways on the wishes and decisions of the President or the secretary of defense or, ultimately, on the interests of any specific group of people in the country who influence the development of policy.

There is no doubt that election campaigns and elections themselves leave their mark on the development of military-strategic concepts. However, as historical experience has shown, the assumption of power in the United States by new administrations has not yet definitely led to any alteration of military-strategic concepts, although their names can change. Many military-strategic concepts which have existed during the years of government by a Republican Administration have continued to exist under a Democratic Administration, and viceversa, with the transition of power from the Democratic to the Republican Party. "The fact of the matter," said former U.S. President R. Nixon, "is that in the sphere of national security each presidency is only a link in the chain. Every government inherits the existing armed forces. The capital investments of previous governments are calculated for a long period and restrict the ability to make changes in these forces in a short space of time."¹²

Many prominent U.S. political and military leaders agree with this opinion. For example, F. Ikle, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and now undersecretary of defense for policy, stated in one of his speeches in January 1977 that present-day strategic forces are largely the result of decisions made as early as the 1950's. He points out that it can take 10 years or so to build and deploy strategic weapons, but as soon as a weapon has been deployed it can remain in operation for 20 years or more.

Here is a concrete example. The system of independently targeted multiple warheads for the Minuteman missiles was developed under the Johnson Administration (December 1964), but the decision to put it into operation was taken after R. Nixon took office (June 1970).

The authors of the book "American National Security. Policy and Process" named "international relations and the military situation, domestic priorities and changes in technology" as the main factors influencing changes in military-strategic concepts.¹³

Of course, all of the aforementioned factors play their role, but there is nevertheless a chief determining factor with a decisive influence on the formation of military-strategic concepts. It is the change in the world balance of power, primarily in the strategic sphere, which has ultimately led to the establishment of military equilibrium. It is precisely this equilibrium that forces American politicians and strategists to analyze and forecast again and again, to construct models and scenarios while taking into account the balance of power on both the global and regional scales, and to appraise the effectiveness of former military-strategic concepts, change them and develop new ones precisely from this vantage point. Existing conditions compel official Washington to display considerable versatility in its search for military-strategic concepts which, in its opinion, could strengthen the positions of the United States and ensure the implementation of its plans and intentions.

In essence, the entire range of military-strategic concepts--"counterforce," "limited war," "essential parity," "assured destruction," "limitation of damage," "strategic sufficiency," "vulnerability" and so forth--provides convincing evidence of the fact that it is precisely the alteration of the balance of power, primarily in the strategic sphere, that has exerted, and continues to exert, a decisive influence on the nature and substance of U.S. military-strategic concepts. And this factor has influenced the evolution of American strategy as a whole, and not only various separate concepts. The transition from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response," and then to the strategy of "realistic deterrence" and so forth, is a direct result of the influence of the aforementioned factor. American ruling circles have been engaged in a search for military-strategic concepts which would best answer the new conditions of the balance of power on the global and regional scales and which would make the fulfillment of foreign policy aims without any particular risk possible.

Another important factor which has a vital and constant influence on the substance of military-strategic concepts and their direction is the modernization and perfection of existing weapons and the commissioning of new systems and new types of weapons. F. Engels revealed the law of the dialectical connection between military technology and weapons and military theory and the influence of new weapons on changes in strategy and tactics. He wrote: "As soon as technological discoveries have become applicable and have been put into practice in military matters, they immediately--almost violently, and frequently against the will of the military command--cause changes and even revolutions in the methods of waging battle." He goes on to say: "It is not the 'creative intellect' of brilliant commanders that has had a revolutionizing effect, but the invention of the best weapons."¹⁴

The entire process of the development of military-strategic thinking in the nuclear age confirms the validity of this law under present conditions.

For example, the appearance of highly accurate nuclear missiles and, what is more, in considerable quantities, has caused the United States to revise, in an extremely dangerous direction, a number of fundamental military-strategic concepts, particularly those which envisage the possibility of a first

disarming strike, the waging of nuclear war, the use of nuclear missiles in this kind of war and victory in this kind of war. The appearance of more accurate weapons and the development and commissioning of operative-tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear mini-weapons, have given rise to the concept of "limited nuclear war."

One could say in general that, in the hands of U.S. imperialist circles, the greatest achievements in the sphere of science and technology are becoming, to a considerable extent, an instrument serving the political aims of these circles and the grounds for the development of new military-strategic concepts aimed at attaining these goals.

Consequently, the evolution of military-strategic concepts in the past and the present is explained neither by changes in the political aims of the U.S. ruling class nor by changes in the general strategic tasks, plans and intentions of the American military-political leadership--they basically remain constant. Their evolution mainly concerns the modes and methods of achieving such aims, and it is explained by the search on the part of the aforementioned circles for the most effective ways of fulfilling these aims under the conditions of the change in the world balance of power and the Soviet Union's achievement of strategic parity.

The main and constant incentive for the revision of military-strategic concepts has always been the desire of American ruling circles to find an opportunity in new and changing conditions for the utilization of nuclear weapons as the chief means of implementing their foreign policy plans.

The military-strategic concepts which are officially announced and openly declared are the most mobile. At the same time, some of them show a certain stability and retain their names, despite changes in the administration. These concepts primarily include "counterforce" and "assured destruction," which have become components of the strategy of "containment" (or "deterrence").

The most stable are the military-strategic concepts incorporated in basic operational planning documents containing a list of targets, forces, means and methods of striking these targets. These documents are drawn up by a small group of people and occasionally have clarifications and certain alterations inserted in connection with the inclusion of new objectives, the increased possibility of striking these objectives and other reasons.

As documents published in the United States show, as mentioned above, irrespective of the form or outer garment in which the declarative section of military-strategic concepts is clothed, the list of targets and planned means of striking these targets are determined by the real plans and intentions of the military command, the existence and diversity of a nuclear arsenal and the tactical-technical potential of nuclear weapons. As a rule, these plans include the broadest possible range of targets and set the task of weakening the other side or depriving it of its counterstrike forces and of bringing about its "assured destruction." Consequently, despite the constant changes in the names of military-strategic concepts, not one category of targets has been excluded from plans for waging a war. Alterations have mainly concerned

the transfer of priorities, scales and required criteria relating to the striking of targets, retargeting and so forth.

Strategic nuclear forces, air force and naval bases and communication and administrative centers have always been prime targets in all plans. Therefore, the concepts of "counterforce" and "assured destruction" continually find reflection in these plans. If one were to judge by published operational documents, then the concept of "counterforce" has never existed in its pure form. But the concept of "assured destruction" has also never existed in its pure form, that is, as a planned strike only against cities and industrial objectives. With the accumulation of nuclear warheads and the increase in their capacity and accuracy, the concept of "counterforce" has been moved into the foreground, but in a different form; it is no longer a concept pursuing the aim of limited damage and has now become a plan for carrying out a first preemptive strike aimed at the assured destruction of the enemy's counterstrike forces.

The change in the balance of power and the achievement of military parity, as well as the development and perfection of weapons, are two decisive factors with an unequal influence on the evolution of military-strategic concepts. The development and perfection of nuclear weapons and their constant buildup have pushed U.S. military circles into developing more aggressive views and plans envisaging the waging of a nuclear war, the protracted nature of such a war and the possibility of carrying out a first disarming strike. On the other hand, the change in the world balance of power, the Soviet Union's achievement of parity in strategic forces and the existence and maintenance of military parity have had a restraining effect on Washington's aggressive plans. This is the reason for the discrepancy in the United States' concrete plans and official statements, the constant inconsistency in its policies and its attempts to present its strategy as a strategy of "containment." But even the achievement of parity in strategic nuclear forces has not stopped the most militarist circles in the United States from striving to gain military superiority by various means and to return to the policy of diktat and hegemonism, or from drawing up plans for a first disarming nuclear strike.

As a whole, the evolution of military-strategic concepts is a complex and multifaceted process influenced by many diverse factors, some of which are constantly in operation and play a decisive role, while others (variables) play a secondary role. One could say that the evolution of U.S. military-strategic concepts in general proceeds unambiguously in the direction of increasingly dangerous trends and aggression. Calculations for a first disarming strike are appearing in these concepts with increasing frequency.

It seems that in the future one should expect an increase in the dangerous trends in American military-strategic concepts, particularly in connection with the existence of plans and the taking of practical steps to develop and deploy various weapon systems in space, capable of striking objectives both in space and on earth from space, and also in connection with the creation of the potential for a disarming strike.

The unprecedented growth of the aggressiveness of American imperialism has greatly intensified the danger of nuclear war. People are interested in improving the situation in the world, and especially in putting an end to the arms race and beginning the reduction and destruction of arms. This is precisely the aim of the numerous initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community.

FOOTNOTES

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6. For example, Air Force and SAC archive documents from the late 1940's on the planning and use of nuclear weapons in wartime are still classified.
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U.S. SAID UNINTERESTED IN NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 84
(signed to press 18 Oct 84) pp 52-56

[Article by V. F. Davydov: "The Problem of Nonproliferation and Washington's Policies"]

[Text] Despite all of the Reagan Administration's attempts to avoid criticism of its policies in the sphere of nuclear nonproliferation on the eve of the presidential elections, life arranges things differently. Neither the administration's statements concerning the high priority of nonproliferation problems in its foreign policy activities nor the forced optimism with regard to the U.S. potential for resolving these problems could conceal the obvious fact that the probability that nuclear weapons will continue to crawl throughout the world has increased sharply during the time that the Reagan Administration has been in power.

In July 1984, 15 influential social organizations in the United States, including the Committee for National Security, "Americans for Democratic Action" and the Union of Concerned Scientists published a joint study called "Stop the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." It cites a number of indisputable facts to prove that the White House's actions have led to a "truly ominous turn" in U.S. policy in the sphere of nuclear nonproliferation. The new coalition has launched a campaign in the United States and in the international arena for a nuclear test ban and for an agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests by 6 August 1985--the 40th anniversary of the American nuclear bombing of Hiroshima.

The majority of Western experts agree that in the first half of the 1980's the main candidates for nuclear status--the Republic of South Africa, Israel and Pakistan--have not only not slowed down their programs but, on the contrary, have accelerated them sharply. Other "near-nuclear" countries, such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan and South Korea, are not lagging behind either. P. Rogers, a political scientist at Bradford University (Great Britain), has concluded from his study of the progress in nuclear programs in the "threshold" countries that more than 10 states among the developing countries alone could acquire nuclear weapons by the beginning of the next century. He stressed: "It is completely possible that...the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and Israel have small nuclear arsenals, and that Israel's nuclear weapons are the most advanced."

Experts note that the aims pursued by the nuclear programs of these states no longer amount only to openly demonstrating their potential for the development of one or several nuclear systems, but also to organizing the long-term, full-scale production of nuclear weapons and ensuring the development of reliable means of supplying themselves with nuclear weapons. Frequent reports in the Western press indicate that Israel and the RSA are working jointly on the technology of cruise missile production and that Israel has already sent the South African racists a 155-mm howitzer capable of firing nuclear ammunition, which was bought by Tel Aviv from the American Space Research firm.

The existing channels of bilateral cooperation between the RSA and Israel in the nuclear spheres are hardly a secret to Washington. But the Reagan Administration prefers to turn a blind eye to these activities on the part of both "threshold" countries, which are obedient American allies in the implementation of anticommunist strategy in Africa and the Middle East. What is more, the Pentagon's plans to modernize its nuclear weapons has sharply heightened its interest in uranium from the RSA, where one-third of all the deposits of this most important strategic raw material in the capitalist world are located. Behind the screen of its policy of "constructive cooperation" with the RSA,* the United States is supplying the racist regime with technology it can use in its military nuclear program. South African ruling circles have recently alleged several times that their country will observe the principles of nonproliferation, but both Pretoria and Israel have flatly refused to sign the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The close military and political cooperation between Washington and Pakistan is acquiring an increasingly scandalous nature. In June 1984 a report prepared by 50 prominent experts on nuclear nonproliferation from the Center for Strategic and International Research at Georgetown University was published. On the basis of the rate of Islamabad's nuclear preparations, the authors of the report make the well-founded prediction that Pakistan will be able to produce 20 nuclear bombs by 1990 and 60 by 2000. Incidentally, Pakistani scientist themselves do not conceal their potential. The leader of Pakistan's nuclear program, A. Kan, proudly said in a NAWA-E WAQT interview in February 1984 that if the authorities gave the green light to the production of nuclear bombs, Pakistani nuclear physicists "would disappoint neither the government nor the country."

It has become a well-known fact that a special group of technicians for the production of nuclear systems is still functioning in Pakistan, although representatives of the Reagan Administration have maintained that it was dissolved when the United States began to provide Islamabad with military aid. All of this is scandalously at variance with statements made by White House spokesmen that Pakistan is supposedly conducting only a peaceful nuclear program. The attention of the American public was once again drawn to Pakistan's nuclear plans when three Pakistanis were arrested in Houston (Texas) in July 1984 when they tried to secretly export components needed in

* SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 7, pp 61-66--Editor's note.

the production of nuclear bombs. WASHINGTON POST correspondent W. Pincus remarked in connection with the arrest that, in the opinion of "some officials, this testifies to Pakistan's increased efforts to acquire components and plans for the development of its own nuclear weapons."

Pakistan's relations with China in the nuclear sphere have also acquired an ominous tone against the background of Islamabad's nuclear preparations. These relations were once again discussed in Congress after the conclusion of an American-Chinese agreement during Ronald Reagan's visit to Beijing in April 1984 concerning deliveries of American nuclear reactors valued at 20 billion dollars.

When the Reagan Administration signed this agreement, it was motivated less by commercial aims than by the hope of utilizing the development of economic relations for political purposes. The White House has shown little concern about the pernicious consequences which could arise from a "nuclear deal" with a country which has not signed the nonproliferation treaty. It was not until Congress, after Reagan's return from Beijing, directly accused the administration of agreeing to supply China with American nuclear technology without receiving guarantees that it would not be transferred to Pakistan that the White House decided to postpone the ratification of American-Chinese agreements, fearing a negative reaction before the elections.

In order to neutralize criticism of its tolerance toward the nuclear ambitions of "threshold countries," the Reagan Administration held a conference of the capitalist countries exporting nuclear technology and materials in Luxemburg in July 1984. The press reported that the conference was called because "countries possessing the potential to build nuclear weapons...could," with the tolerance of Western firms, "purchase components and dual-purpose technology for the production of nuclear materials, including nuclear weapons" and that "conference participants are most alarmed by the growth of Pakistan's nuclear potential."

American scientists, congressmen and the mass media have recently devoted increasingly serious attention to the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Statements on the importance of this matter to the security of the United States itself have even been made by the administration. However, it stubbornly does not wish to admit that it is precisely its own policies that have contributed significantly to the exacerbation of the situation in this sphere. Washington has advanced the thesis that close military and political cooperation between the United States and "near-nuclear" countries is capable of reducing their incentives to acquire their own nuclear weapons. This has justified deliveries of contemporary weapons, contacts with countries striving to acquire nuclear weapons and the extensive use of these contacts in the exertion of global military pressure on socialist states and states liberated from colonial oppression. This policy, however, has by no means been conducive to its declared aim--the restraint of the nuclear ambitions of "threshold" countries. The problems of nuclear nonproliferation have in fact occupied a subordinate and insignificant place among the Reagan Administration's foreign policy priorities in comparison to its policy of acting from a position of strength and its objective of military superiority to the USSR.

The administration's policy of escalating the nuclear arms race is the main reason for the ineffectiveness of the nonproliferation treaty, which now has been signed by 120 states. This treaty is based on a balance of obligations: Non-nuclear states must not acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear states must take steps toward disarmament. Even at the second international conference held to verify the effect of the nonproliferation treaty in 1980, there were distinct signs that the nonobservance of this balance of obligations through the fault of the United States has had a negative effect upon the nonproliferation framework as a whole. On the eve of the third conference, scheduled for 1985, the situation appears even more alarming. The Reagan Administration is blocking the conclusion of an agreement with the USSR on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and flatly refuses to renew trilateral (United States, USSR and Great Britain) negotiations on a complete and general nuclear test ban. The Pentagon is now building more and more new types of nuclear weapons, increasing the production of fissionable materials for nuclear warheads and openly announcing its preparations for "limited" and "protracted" nuclear wars. All of this attests to only thing in the eyes of non-nuclear signatories of the nonproliferation treaty: The United States is not fulfilling its obligations as a nuclear power according to Article VI of the treaty.*

In this situation, many signatories of the nonproliferation treaty are wondering whether they can reconcile themselves to a situation in which the United States is urging others not to build nuclear weapons while it continues to gamble on these weapons as an instrument of its political and military expansion. The majority of experts now agree that the stability and effectiveness of the nonproliferation framework will ultimately depend on the United States' attitude toward its obligations to fulfill every article of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons without exception.

The problem of what steps should be taken to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is now being discussed extensively by American experts. It was also the central topic in a report entitled "The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Toward Global Restraint," prepared by the United Nations Association of the United States and distributed in June 1984 to the UN secretary general, the U.S. secretary of state and a number of congressmen. The report was discussed in June 1984 at a meeting in Moscow between representatives of the American and Soviet UN associations.

The report states that the U.S. Administration must actually, and not just verbally, give high priority to its policies in the sphere of nuclear nonproliferation and must also acknowledge that the prevention of the further proliferation of these weapons is a most important part of the prevention of nuclear war. The proliferation of nuclear weapons not only increases the danger of their use but also makes the task of nuclear disarmament extremely difficult.

* For more detail, see V. F. Petrovskiy, "Important Area of the Struggle Against the Nuclear Threat," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 7--Editor's note.

The authors of the report recommend immediate steps to increase the effectiveness of the policy of nonproliferation, advising the U.S. Administration to cease all cooperation in the nuclear sphere with those states which refuse to place all of their nuclear activity under international control, to discuss ways of breaking off trade in dangerous forms of nuclear equipment at a conference of leading suppliers of nuclear technology and materials, including the USSR and other socialist countries, and to strive to universalize a nonproliferation framework with an appropriate treaty. The report emphasizes that only by joint effort on the part of all interested states will it be possible to slow down the process of nuclear proliferation, if not completely halted, by creating considerable obstacles in the path of those countries which have decided to acquire their own nuclear weapons.

In the opinion of American experts, Soviet-American cooperation in matters of nonproliferation is acquiring key significance for the success of these efforts. The report contains the conclusion that measures by the United States and the USSR to control the nuclear arms race would be a decisive factor in the stability of the nonproliferation framework. The authors recommend that the U.S. Administration fulfill Article VI of the nonproliferation treaty by immediately renewing and seriously conducting negotiations with the USSR and Great Britain, with the addition of other nuclear states, on the complete banning of nuclear testing. This kind of treaty could become an additional barrier to keep a number of states from building their own nuclear weapons.

The United Nations Association of the United States also urged the administration to seriously consider the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. If their production were to be stopped by the nuclear states, this would considerably complicate the activities of "near-nuclear" states in their accumulation of such materials, and it would also help to create definite international standards which both nuclear and "near-nuclear" states would be compelled to observe.

The report places special emphasis on nuclear-free zones as an additional barrier in the way of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The authors recommend that the administration provide constructive assistance in the creation of nuclear-free zones in those regions of the world where there is a strong threat of "near-nuclear" states entering the ranks of the nuclear states--the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

The main conclusions and recommendations contained in the report--the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty, the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the formation of nuclear-free zones--are consonant with the Soviet Union's proposals for a stronger nuclear nonproliferation framework.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared its loyalty to the cause of nonproliferation and its willingness to cooperate with interested parties in strengthening the nonproliferation framework. Proposing a set of standards to which, in the opinion of the Soviet leadership, relations between nuclear powers must submit, K. U. Chernenko said in his speech to the voters on 2 March 1984: "Under no circumstances must nuclear weapons be used against

non-nuclear countries on whose territories such weapons do not exist. The status of existing nuclear-free zones must be respected and the creation of new ones in various regions of the world must be encouraged.

"The proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form must be prevented: These weapons or control over them must not be handed over to anyone; they must not be deployed on the territories of countries which have no such weapons; the nuclear arms race must not be carried into new spheres, including outer space."

The sharp increase in the threat of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has occurred since the Reagan Administration has been in power, testifies that as long as the United States professes a cult of nuclear weapons, pursues an unlimited nuclear arms race, flirts with regimes which are straining for nuclear bombs and builds up military and political tension in the world, it will be impossible to count on the effectiveness of the non-proliferation framework, however many statements on this score the Reagan Administration might make.

Will Washington draw the appropriate conclusions from the alarming situation which has been created in the sphere of nuclear nonproliferation? This question will be answered by its future actions.

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CSO: 1803/4

U.S. ATTITUDE AT GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ASSAILED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 84
(signed to press 18 Oct 84) pp 56-61

[Article by V. I. Baburov: "Multilateral Talks on Disarmament: Two Approaches"; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The escalation of international tension through the fault of the United States and its allies has had a direct effect on the work of the Geneva Disarmament Conference (called the Committee on Disarmament until 1984)--the organ for the multilateral negotiation of this extremely important issue.

The main points on its agenda are being discussed in an atmosphere of fierce political struggle between the socialist states and the majority of nonaligned countries on one side and the United States and its allies on the other.

THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR is an important conference topic. As a result of the efforts of the USSR and other socialist states, with the support of nonaligned and neutral countries (the "group of 21"),* this topic was introduced as a separate point on the agenda for the first time this year.

At the spring session of the conference, from 7 February to 27 April, the socialist countries stressed the urgent need to prevent nuclear war under the present conditions of the mounting threat to peace and heightened military preparations by the United States and other NATO countries and advocated the immediate creation of a special committee to discuss the matter. At that time, a group of socialist countries submitted a draft document to the conference, stipulating the specific measures on which the discussions of this point on the agenda should be focused.

The document directed the attention of conference participants to the proposal put forth by K. U. Chernenko on 2 March 1984 on the need to make relations between nuclear powers subject to specific standards corresponding to the

* The "group of 21" is made up of Algeria, Argentina, Burma, Brazil, Venezuela, Egypt, Zaire, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Cuba, Morocco, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and Yugoslavia--Editor's note.

vital interests of all mankind. The socialist countries proposed that the prevention of nuclear war be viewed as the main foreign policy aim of the nuclear powers, that all propaganda about nuclear war in any form be ceased and that all nuclear powers follow the Soviet Union's example and pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states on whose territory such weapons do not exist and to respect the status of existing nuclear-free zones and encourage the creation of new ones.

Besides this, in the document the delegations from the socialist states requested that military force be excluded from the sphere of intergovernmental relations by means of an international nonaggression treaty and an agreement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries on the mutual nonuse of military force and maintenance of peaceful relations. They also suggested the consideration of several concrete measures, including a quantitative and qualitative freeze on nuclear arsenals, the prohibition of nuclear tests, with a moratorium on all nuclear explosions until this kind of agreement has been concluded, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including the refusal to develop a broad-scale, space-based ABM system.

The document stressed the importance of creating the kind of political climate in which any attempt to start a nuclear war would be destined to fail. In an amplification of the UN declaration on a condemnation of nuclear war, it also proposed that all states consider the inclusion of statements condemning nuclear war in relevant documents of a political nature. The socialist states also expressed their willingness to seriously consider all proposals aimed at the prevention of nuclear war.

The nonaligned and neutral states have joined the socialist countries in proposing the negotiation of practical steps to prevent nuclear war and the creation of a special committee for this purpose.

As for the United States and its NATO allies, they have tried to avoid total isolation by not rejecting these proposals outright, but have worded the mandate of the special committee in such a way as to essentially divert it from the problem of preventing nuclear war. The purpose of these maneuvers is to impede the creation of the proposed committee and the commencement of actual steps in this direction.

The American delegation took the same position on another major point on the Disarmament Conference agenda--CURTAILMENT OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. The obstructionist behavior of the United States and several other Western states made it impossible to pass a resolution creating a working body for the discussion of this topic at the spring session and the summer session (from 12 June to 30 August). Representatives from these countries alleged that they see no subject for negotiation here and are avoiding the discussion of this matter on this pretext. What is more, the negative U.S. position on this issue at the Disarmament Conference is in sharp contrast to the American Administration's statements that its chief aim is "to reduce the danger of nuclear war and lower the level of nuclear weapons."

Along with other socialist countries, the Soviet Union has consistently advocated the immediate commencement of genuine negotiations at the Disarmament Conference for the purpose of concluding a treaty on a TOTAL AND UNIVERSAL NUCLEAR TEST BAN. It took an active part in the work of the special group on the prohibition of nuclear tests, despite its limited mandate, for the last 2 years for the purpose of making progress and in the spirit of compromise. In view of the fact that the group's work has produced no concrete results, the delegations from the socialist countries have resolutely advocated the revision of its previous powers so that it can begin drafting the appropriate agreement in earnest.

The Mexican delegation, supported by other members of the "group of 21," proposed the immediate commencement of multilateral talks for the purpose of a treaty banning all nuclear tests and suggested that an effort be made to step up this work so that the Disarmament Conference can submit the negotiated draft treaty to the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly. The U.S. delegation announced, however, that it regards the prohibition of nuclear tests only as a "long-range," "long-term" policy aim and insisted on the preservation of the working group's limited mandate, which envisages the discussion and investigation of matters pertaining to control and verification, and not the organization of actual negotiations.

The underlying motives of American representatives at the Geneva forum are self-evident in view of the fact that an underground nuclear test program is being conducted on increasingly broad scales in the United States. During the course of this program, new warheads are being perfected, various types of combat equipment are being tested, the effects of radioactivity on the crews of tanks, helicopters and bombers are being studied, and so forth.

Prestigious U.S. politicians, however, have acknowledged the need to solve this problem. In June 1984, a group of senators and congressmen advised the administration to resume the U.S.-Soviet-English talks on the total and universal nuclear test ban. In the opinion of Senator E. Kennedy, the conclusion of this kind of treaty "would be the first important step toward a complete freeze on nuclear weapons." He believes that this treaty "would stop the development of increasingly dangerous, powerful and accurate nuclear warheads and would help to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

The negative approach of the United States and its closest allies to this matter is particularly disturbing in light of the conclusion drawn by a group of seismologists in their third report prepared for the Disarmament Conference. The group concluded that the efficient international exchange of seismic data could be organized on the global level within the framework of a treaty on the total and universal prohibition of nuclear tests (with the understanding, of course, that a system for the international exchange of seismic data could be established only after this treaty has gone into effect). A satisfactory technical system has been developed on the basis of methods, accessible to a broad range of states, for the acquisition and exchange of seismic information. The recommendations of the group of experts constitute a solid foundation for the creation of a system of informational exchange in this sphere.

The Soviet delegation stressed that the continuation of the work of this group would be meaningless unless the United States ceases its attempts to inhibit the actual negotiation of a total and universal nuclear test-ban treaty. Acting in a constructive manner, it also announced that if the conference should revise the mandate of the auxiliary body on the prohibition of nuclear tests and begin drafting a total and universal nuclear test-ban treaty, the Soviet Union would be willing to consider the possibility, proposed by Sweden, of the international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity on the same basis as the exchange of seismic data.

The Soviet delegation submitted an entire group of proposals on another important point on the Disarmament Conference agenda--THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE. The matter is being discussed at a time when the danger of new space weapons has been heightened dramatically through the fault of the United States. This was pointed out with alarm by the majority of conference speakers.

At a plenary session of the conference on 19 June 1984, Soviet representative V. L. Israelyan stressed that the prevention of a race for space weapons is a matter of exceptional importance. He directed attention to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium K. U. Chernenko's replies to the questions of American journalist J. Kingsbury-Smith, in which he stressed that all problems pertaining to this matter, including problems of control, could be resolved successfully during the course of the talks proposed by the Soviet Union on antisatellite weapons and on the prevention of the militarization of space in general if there is a genuine interest in reaching effective agreements.

Delegates from the USSR and other socialist countries criticized the official U.S. plans to create space weapon systems and underscored their dangerous nature. They stated that American plans for a space-based ABM system could undermine the strategic arms limitation process and open the flood-gates for a new round of the arms race. The USSR delegation submitted a Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth, drawn up in 1983.

In addition to stating the basic provision of the draft, the USSR delegation explained the Soviet side's far-reaching steps to facilitate the negotiation of this international agreement. A particularly significant one is the USSR's unilateral pledge not to launch antisatellite weapons as long as other states, including the United States, refrain from putting such weapons in space. They also confirmed the USSR's willingness to negotiate these matters on a bilateral basis with the United States and to conduct separate talks on antisatellite systems, including talks with the United States, as a step in the attainment of the general goal of preventing the use of force in space and from space.

The need for immediate measures to prevent the militarization of outer space was stressed again in a Soviet Government statement published on 30 June 1984. It requested the American side to begin Soviet-American talks on this matter for the purpose of the mutual and total renunciation of antisatellite systems

and the establishment of a foundation for a multilateral agreement on this matter. "Space weapons of any basing variety should not be developed, tested or deployed for ABM defense, as antisatellite weapons or for use against targets on earth or in flight. Existing weapons of this kind should be destroyed," the statement said.

The USSR and other socialist countries want the negotiation of measures to prevent an arms race in space to begin as soon as possible and are insisting on the creation of a special body for this purpose, with adequate authority, in accordance with the resolution of the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly on the prevention of an arms race in space. The mandate of this working body should promote the commencement of serious talks without delay for the negotiation of an international agreement.

The neutral and nonaligned states have taken a position similar to that of the socialist countries, expressing serious worries about the real danger that the arms race could spread to outer space. Detailed statements on the matter were issued by Sweden, Argentina, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Yugoslavia, India, Venezuela and Mexico. Subjecting the American plans for space-based ABM systems to well-founded criticism, an Indian spokesman stressed that these weapon systems will open the flood-gates for an unrestricted arms race in outer space and on earth. He criticized the negative U.S. position directly when he said that the conference had not begun negotiating this important matter yet, in spite of the wishes of the international community, expressed in a number of UN resolutions, but meanwhile "the situation on earth is full of rapid and disturbing developments and events which could have a catastrophic effect on the future of the human race."

The line of the socialist states and the majority of nonaligned states is in sharp contrast to the position of the United States, England and some other NATO countries, which are making every effort to impede the commencement of talks on the prevention of the militarization of space. In essence, the Western countries have refused to discuss the matter. A detailed statement was presented at a plenary session by the delegation from Italy--the coordinator of the group of Western countries on this matter. In view of the interest of the overwhelming majority of conference participants in the creation of a committee to discuss this matter, the Western countries have not objected to this. Under U.S. pressure, however, they have tried to confine the mandate of this committee only to the investigation of questions pertaining to this matter. The American approach is based on the argument that the conference should discuss a broad range of problems connected with the control of weapons in space, beginning with a thorough investigation of a legal framework for outer space, before any conclusions can be drawn with regard to negotiations.

The U.S. maneuvers in this exceptionally important area of discussion were complicated considerably in June 1984, when the USSR requested the American side to begin negotiating the prevention of the militarization of outer space. This met with the approval of many American scientists and politicians. In the words of Harvard University Professor E. Mendelsohn, "the Soviet Union's

proposal is an excellent basis for the conclusion of this kind of agreement." According to Republican Senator L. Pressler, "the chief U.S. priority should be the establishment of control over the arms race in space." "To prevent a new arms race in space, the United States should revise its policy line," P. Clausen, an expert on this matter from the Union of Concerned Scientists wrote in the NEW YORK TIMES. "It must stop testing antisatellite weapons and begin negotiating the future cessation of tests, and it must give up the costly, laborious and dangerous work on the 'star wars' ABM system."

The approach of the United States and several Western countries to the discussion of a ban on chemical weapons and on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction--that is, virtually all other items on the agenda--is still counterproductive. For example, the widely publicized American proposals on the prohibition of chemical weapons actually turned out to be another propaganda maneuver. They contained nothing new in principle, and besides this they were obviously unacceptable to many conference participants because they demanded the scrupulous monitoring of the territory of other states.

The approach of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, which have requested the NATO states to give up a policy undermining the bases of peace and take practical steps toward detente, constitute a foundation for the successful resolution of urgent problems in arms limitation and cooperation with all countries with a sincere desire to strengthen international security.

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CSO: 1803/4

SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE TODAY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 84
(signed to press 18 Oct 84) pp 61-68

[Article by O. Ye. Tishchenko]

[Text] Life constantly confirms the accuracy of V. I. Lenin's statements and conclusions about the development of economic relations between the USSR and the capitalist countries. He attached great significance to their development and believed that they should be based on the objective need for economic contacts between states with differing socioeconomic structures. Back in 1921, he said: "If there is a force stronger than the desire, wishes and determination of any of the inimical governments or classes, this is the force of world economic relations, which force them to initiate this form of communication with us."¹ Even today, despite the recent escalation of international tension, the tendency toward the development of East-West trade still exists. The Soviet State, adhering firmly to the Leninist line of peaceful coexistence by the two systems, has continuously favored the development of stable commercial and economic relations with Western countries displaying an interest in this. Mutual interest in active cooperation has maintained the commercial relations of the USSR with the majority of Western countries on a high level, and is even expanding these relations with some states.

The USSR's trade with the West European countries has displayed the most extensive development. IN 1983 alone, the increase in turnover was 6.4 percent, and total turnover reached 31.6 billion rubles. The countries of this region account for around 82 percent of all Soviet trade with developed capitalist states.² Our economic contacts with West European countries are based on a solid foundation of legal contracts. It is made up of international agreements on economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation with almost all of the Western countries and on long-term programs of cooperation with them, defining the prospects and specific guidelines for the development of mutually beneficial economic relations.

In addition to trade, new forms of economic cooperation with Western countries are being established--industrial cooperation, trade in licenses, cooperation in the markets of third countries, etc. Many firms in developed capitalist states are participating in massive projects for the construction of industrial facilities in the USSR, some of them on a compensatory basis.

The trade between the USSR and the United States is in sharp contrast to this. Their commercial and economic relations have undergone serious deterioration in recent years and are now in a state of stagnation. The reason for this is Washington's series of attempts to use trade as an instrument of political pressure on the Soviet Union. Proceeding from the false assumption that trade with the United States is of vital importance to the USSR,³ the United States regards the offer of nondiscriminatory terms in trade, which are common in international practices and law, as a privilege in exchange for U.S.-dictated changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policy. The State Department, for example, has frankly announced: "We cannot separate our economic policy in relations with the Soviet Union from Soviet behavior in general."⁴ This policy is recorded in American legislation on the regulation of exports, authorizing the prohibition or limitation of exports of any commodities, technology or information for the purpose of "significant advances in U.S. foreign policy."⁵

The U.S. position is contrary to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and is justifiably regarded by the Soviet Union as interference in its internal affairs.

As a result of Washington's policy in this sphere, the volume of mutual trade declined from over 2.8 billion rubles in 1979 to 1.9 billion in 1983. But this is only the quantitative side of the matter, which never, even in relatively favorable periods, corresponded to the potential possibilities of commercial cooperation between such large and highly developed countries as the USSR and the United States. The "qualitative" side of commercial and economic relations is in an even worse state. Back in 1972 a bilateral agreement was signed on trade, envisaging its normalization on the basis of the common principles of international law and practice. This agreement has still not gone into effect, and this is not our fault. Soviet-American trade is still being conducted in the absence of the most-favored-nation terms which were envisaged in this agreement and whose importance was recorded in the Final Act signed in Helsinki in 1975. The 1974 U.S. act on trade authorizes legal, from Washington's standpoint, interference in Soviet internal affairs and precludes the enactment of the abovementioned agreement on trade. Former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow G. Kennan, the well-known American scholar and politician, said that the "Jackson-Vanik amendment (to the 1974 act--O. T.) and the subsequent demise of the trade agreement stroke a blow against any hope of maintaining the considerable momentum resulting from the development of Soviet-American relations at the start of the 1970's."⁶

Besides this, the American Administration used events in Afghanistan and in Poland as a pretext to stop the activities of the Soviet-American commission on trade, to refuse to sign a new shipping agreement and to prohibit Soviet planes from making flights to the United States.

All of this naturally affected the level and structure of trade.

For example, Soviet exports to the United States in recent years have been only one-tenth as great on the average as imports from this country. This abnormal state of affairs is largely due to the discriminatory provisions of

the same 1974 act, in accordance with which customs duties on goods from the USSR are much higher than the duties on goods from other countries. On the average, duties on Soviet exports to the United States are 15-20 percent, but they virtually never exceed 5 percent in the case of the products of countries with most-favored-nation status. The level of discrimination is particularly high in the case of machines and equipment. The duties on many potential Soviet exports to the United States are 2-5 times as high as those for other countries. For example, the figure is usually 6-10 percent for metal-cutting tools, but for the USSR is 30-45 percent. The respective figures for electric motors are 5 percent and 35 percent, and Soviet duties are 6 times as high for ball bearings, 2-4 times as high for oil, 2 times as high for diesel fuel, 3-7 times as high for ferroalloys and 6 times as high for certain chemicals.

At present, despite the fact that the volume of Soviet exports to the United States is already small (around 200 million rubles a year for the last 10 years), stronger attempts are being made in the United States to reduce it even more with ridiculous charges that the USSR is guilty of "market violations," the subsidization of exports or the use of "compulsory labor" in the manufacture of Soviet export goods.

As for Soviet imports from the United States, the proportion accounted for by machines and equipment has fallen to less than one-fourth of its previous level in recent years (621 million rubles in 1976 and 144 million in 1983). This is due, in the first place, to the U.S. refusal to extend government credit to the Soviet Union (this became a common form of credit in transactions involving machines and equipment in international trade long ago) and, secondly, to restrictions imposed by the United States on the pretext that the export of certain goods to the USSR will allegedly augment its "military potential." The groundlessness of these statements is so obvious that no proof is needed.

The USSR, in line with its approval of extensive participation in international division of labor, buys foreign machines and equipment meeting current requirements, and this is the legitimate right of any client. Of course, the restriction of exports of certain items for national security reasons is the sovereign right of a state. But this right should be used intelligently. Its abuse and attempts to establish an economic or technological blockade will rebound, as experience has shown, inflicting considerable material damages on the initiator of these actions.

Raw materials account for a large portion of Soviet-American trade. In particular, there are the reciprocal shipments of phosphorus fertilizers and ammonia, conducted in accordance with a large-scale 20-year exchange agreement signed in 1973 with the Occidental Petroleum firm, which is being implemented successfully.

Grain, particularly fodder grain, is an important trade item. In August 1983, after a law was passed in the United States to guarantee the fulfillment of contracts for the delivery of agricultural products, a new agreement was concluded by the USSR and United States on trade in some agricultural commodities.

In connection with this, we should recall the fiasco connected with the partial U.S. embargo on grain deliveries to the USSR which was instituted in 1980, lasted only 16 months and was only injurious to the American side. According to the estimates of Schnittker Associates, a Washington consultative firm, this embargo cost the United States 22 billion dollars in the form of agricultural and business losses and extra government expenditures. It also led to the loss of 310,000 jobs and reduced the personal income of Americans by 3.1 billion dollars.

The United States also suffered heavy losses in connection with the restriction imposed in 1982 on deliveries of oil and gas equipment to the USSR. According to the estimates of Undersecretary of Commerce L. Olmer, they cost the United States a total of around 1.2 billion dollars.⁷ In reference to the administration's policy of sanctions, former President R. Nixon remarked: "Economic pressure on Russia produced no results even when the communists had just taken charge and were dealing with much more serious problems; it is even less likely to work now."⁸ This policy also seriously injured America's reputation as a business partner.

In spite of all the obstacles the Washington Administration had put in the way of the development of American-Soviet commercial and economic relations, however, business groups in both countries still have an objective interest in mutual cooperation. This is clearly confirmed, in particular, by the successful activities of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC) in recent years.

The ASTEC was created in accordance with an intergovernmental protocol of 22 June 1973, signed by USSR Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev and then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury G. Shultz at the time of a Soviet-American summit meeting. From the legal standpoint, this is an American corporation, established in accordance with the laws of the State of New York. It is a social organization of business groups in both countries, and its main purpose, according to its by-laws, is "to promote the development of mutually beneficial trade, economic cooperation and scientific and technical contacts between organizations and companies in the USSR and the United States."⁹

The ASTEC's present members are 230 American firms and organizations and 119 Soviet foreign trade, industrial and other organizations. The council's supreme body is the annual meeting of its members, convened alternately in the USSR and the United States, and its administrative body is its board, with 30 elected directors from each side. The honorary director of the ASTEC on the Soviet side has been USSR Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev since the day of the council's founding. There has been no honorary director on the American side since 1980 because the by-laws stipulate that this position can be occupied only by the co-chairman of the Soviet-American Commission on Trade, and its meetings were stopped by the American side in connection with the events in Afghanistan.

The ASTEC board elects two co-chairmen from among its members and an executive committee, with six representatives from each side, including the co-chairmen. Elections to the board are held at annual meetings of the ASTEC

members. The council also has a number of specialized working committees--on scientific and technical cooperation, in new forms of economic cooperation, on finance, on tourism, on small and medium-sized firms and a legal committee. The council has its headquarters in New York and a branch in Moscow. The council staff is mixed, and it is headed by the president of the ASTEC.

Annual meetings of the ASTEC members, sessions of the board and working committees and the many individual and group business meetings have been largely commercial-political in nature. Participants in annual meetings in the USSR have been received by heads of the Soviet State, and those in the United States have met with the President.

A great deal of useful work is performed on the committee level. Reports by Soviet and American specialists are presented and discussed at committee sessions, and recommendations are drawn up on certain aspects of commercial relations between the two countries. Another important field of ASTEC activity is the promotion and organization of seminars in Moscow (20-25 a year) by U.S. firms belonging to the council for Soviet specialists in industry, science and foreign trade organizations. Considerable individual work is also performed for the assistance of council members and Soviet industrial ministries and departments in the organization of commercial contacts and negotiations. Since 1975 the council has been publishing a journal, which plays an important role in providing business groups with information about the economy and foreign trade of both countries.

In 1979-1981 the American administrators of the council agreed to reduce its activities under pressure from the U.S. Government. This reduced the number of American members (from 278 in 1979 to 230 in 1983). Annual meetings were not convened during this period. Nevertheless, the council has had an extremely impressive nucleus (on the American side) of 135 firms and banks from the very beginning: 65 of the firms fall into the "big business" category and are on the list of the 500 largest industrial corporations, and 7 firms are among the 25 largest in the capitalist world.

As a result of the efforts of business groups in both countries, the seventh annual meeting of the ASTEC was held in Moscow in November 1982. In 1983, however, there was no meeting because the U.S. Administration insisted on its postponement, using the U.S.-provoked incident involving the South Korean airplane as a pretext.

Nevertheless, last October the "agribusiness U.S.A.-83" exhibit was held in Moscow under council auspices, with the participation of representatives from more than 100 American firms. It was attended by over 60,000 specialists from interested Soviet organizations. The exhibit results indicated livelier activity by the American firms in the Soviet market and increased interest in trade with our country. This was followed by preparations for the next, eighth annual meeting of the ASTEC.

It was held at the end of May 1984 in New York and was attended by representatives of 150 American firms, banks and associations and several

high-placed members of the U.S. Administration. The American businessmen who attended the meeting included representatives from such large firms as Armco Steel, Dresser Industries, Occidental Petroleum, Monsanto, Caterpillar, Pepsico, John Deere and General Electric.

Participants in the meeting acknowledged that the message from General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium K. U. Chernenko contributed a great deal to the businesslike, constructive atmosphere of the meeting. It specifically mentioned the ASTEC's positive role in the development of cooperation between Soviet and American business groups and said that the Soviet Union has consistently favored stable and extensive commercial and economic ties with all countries, including, of course, the United States. American Co-chairman of the ASTEC and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Armco Steel W. Veriti Jr. stated: "This is an extremely important message. It clearly attests to the USSR's desire to develop mutually beneficial trade. I agree completely with the statement that trade should be built on a foundation of equality and mutual advantage and without any kind of discrimination." President R. Reagan also sent a message to the meeting, saying that the U.S. Government favors the development of mutually beneficial "non-strategic" trade with the Soviet Union on the condition that improvements in the international situation make this possible.

The present state and future prospects of Soviet-American commercial and economic relations were discussed at the council meeting. In his report on this topic, council Co-chairman and USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade V. N. Sushkov stressed that the fact that the meeting was being held reflected the desire of organizations and firms in the two greatest nations to maintain communications. This fact attests to a desire to maintain mutually beneficial trade and scientific and technical exchange and to thereby promote the restoration of smoother, more stable relations between the two states. Our meeting, V. N. Sushkov said, is proof of the intentions of business groups in both countries to maintain and reinforce the ASTEC as an important channel of communication. The development of Soviet-American trade, the head of our delegation stressed, will be possible on the condition of the American side's unconditional observance of its commitments, and the considerable expansion of this trade can be secured only if the U.S. Administration promotes trade instead of impeding it.

In his report, W. Veriti expressed the opinion that trade is often made conditional upon politics and said with regret that the volume of Soviet-American commercial and economic cooperation is much smaller than it could be. He remarked that the presence of so many American businessmen at the ASTEC meeting proved conclusively that the U.S. business community is interested in developing trade with the USSR. In the words of W. Veriti, its development could be promoted by the observance of contractual obligations by the United States and by actions to prove that America is a reliable trade partner. He expressed the belief that the development of commercial ties can promote overall improvement in the relations between the USSR and the United States.

Sessions of all council committees were held at the same time as the general ASTEC meeting.

Group discussions of the significance of compensatory and barter transactions, the role of export companies and the development of services in Soviet-American commercial and economic relations were also held.

Official statements were made at the meeting by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Agriculture R. Lyng, Deputy Secretary of Commerce C. Brown and former Secretary of Commerce J. Kreps. After making an essentially objective assessment of the present state and future prospects of commercial and economic relations, they stressed that the United States is allegedly not waging an economic war against the Soviet Union and does support the trade in "non-strategic" goods with the USSR. They stated that the development of Soviet-American commercial and economic relations would be conditional upon the improvement of political relations. They spoke at length on the need to restore the American side's reputation as a reliable business partner and the need for new export control legislation stipulating the "sanctity" of contracts. Lyng announced that the United States did not intend to resort to any more embargoes on shipments of agricultural products to the USSR.

Against the background of these largely constructive statements, the statement made by M. Palmer, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, sounded a note of dissonance. It was openly anti-Soviet and made reference to several matters absolutely unrelated to trade.¹⁰

Palmer's statement evoked an extremely negative reaction in the meeting hall. The NEW YORK TIMES reported: "The atmosphere of cooperation was overshadowed by the speech presented by...M. Palmer. He mentioned trade only in passing and put all of the blame for the deterioration of relations between the two countries on the Soviet Union. 'This was wrong,' declared Veriti, whose words reflected the indignation aroused in American businessmen by Palmer's comments, 'but luckily, none of the Soviet representatives felt the need to respond to his words.'"¹¹

The Americans who attended the meeting expressed a desire to develop trade with the Soviet Union and stressed that it is particularly important to American firms now, at this time of fierce competition in capitalist markets and a huge deficit in the U.S. balance of trade (around 69 billion dollars in 1983). The need to eliminate the trade barriers erected by Washington was pointed out several times.

The increasing interest of the U.S. business community in the development of commercial and economic relations with the Soviet Union was also demonstrated when members of the Soviet delegation had more than 280 business meetings with American businessmen during the days of the annual meeting.

A unanimously approved resolution specifically stated that the development of commercial and economic relations between the USSR and United States, based on equality, mutual benefit and the unconditional fulfillment of commitments, will contribute to the improvement of bilateral relations, the relaxation of international tension and the preservation of peace. The document also said that Soviet and U.S. businessmen should concentrate on restoring trust in

their commercial and economic relations and observing the principles and standards of international trade for the purpose of creating a stable and favorable basis for the normalization and development of commercial relations.

Resolutions were also passed by the council's working organs. The executive committee resolved, in particular, to hold a U.S. power engineering and environmental protection exhibit in Moscow in 1985 and a Soviet exhibit of scientific and technical achievements in the United States in 1986.

The meeting of Soviet and American business groups could provide definite momentum for the improvement of the situation in Soviet-American trade.

What are the prospects for this trade? The history of bilateral commercial and economic relations indicates that it will depend largely on political relations between the two countries. Does this mean that trade prospects are completely unfavorable in view of the present difficulties in political relations? Probably not. The success of the eight annual meeting of the ASTEC again demonstrated the presence of mutual interest in mutually beneficial cooperation. As speakers remarked at the meeting, possibilities for this kind of cooperation exist in connection with the food program adopted in the USSR (cooperation in the food industry, agricultural machine building, equipment for the processing and storage of agricultural products, etc.). The USSR energy program also provides certain opportunities for cooperation (in such areas as the equipment and technology of coal, oil and gas extraction, processing and transport). Opportunities for cooperation also exist in such industries as the petrochemical and chemical industries, metallurgy, light industry, machine building and the production of mining, road-construction and other equipment.

It should be borne in mind, however, that no significant increase in trade can be expected unless the United States establishes normal conditions for trade with the Soviet Union and unless the Soviet Union can be completely certain that the commitments assumed by American firms will not be canceled unilaterally.

The Soviet Union's position is not affected by temporary changes. "We are willing to engage in peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation with the states of all continents," K. U. Chernenko stressed at the special February (1984) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.¹²

Therefore, everything now depends on the American side.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 44, pp 304-305.
2. All data on Soviet foreign trade in the article are taken from the annual editions of Vnezhnyaya trgovlya SSSR. Statisticheskiy sbornik" [USSR Foreign Trade. Statistical Handbook].

3. It accounts for only around 1.5 percent of all Soviet foreign trade and around 0.1 percent of the USSR gross social product.
4. "East-West Commercial Policy: A Congressional Dialogue with the Reagan Administration," Washington, 1982, p 62.
5. "Export Administration Act of 1979," Sec 6(a).
6. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1976, Vol 54, No 4, p 688.
7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 June 1982.
8. R. Nixon, "The Case for 'Hardheaded' Detente," INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 23 August 1982.
9. "U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council. By-laws," New York 1974, p 1.
10. M. Palmer, "Remarks to the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council Meeting," 23 May 1984.
11. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 May 1984.
12. "Materialy vneocherednogo Plenuma TsK KPSS, 13 fevralyn 1984 g." [Materials of the Special CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 13 February 1984], Moscow, 1984, p 20.

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U.S. BLAMED FOR IMPEDING CULTURAL TIES WITH USSR

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 84
(signed to press 18 Oct 84) pp 68-74

[Article by G. P. Dobrosel'skaya: "Exchange of Intellectual Values"]

[Text] Soviet-American cultural relations in the postwar period have developed in a difficult and contradictory situation. Cooperation between the two countries in the sphere of culture was effectively reduced to a minimum under "cold war" conditions. Whereas the centuries-old interaction and mutual communication between the Russian and West European cultures have laid the ground for the development of good traditions in this sphere of cooperation, traditions which are sufficiently stable in relation to changes in the political climate, the situation in this respect has been more difficult in relations with the United States. The relations between the United States and the USSR in this sphere have lacked this kind of firm and long-term basis and have changed relatively easily in accordance with political events.

In addition to this, the anti-Soviet stereotypes actively cultivated by American ruling circles have inevitably affected these relations and created a negative climate in the change of intellectual values, particularly the exchange of books and other printed matter, in relations in the arts and so forth. Finally, for a long time exchanges of this kind were sporadic because they were not regulated by the provisions of any formal agreements. Soviet books actually had no access to the American book market, and Americans had no opportunity to become acquainted with Soviet achievements in literature and art. On the other hand, during the same period, the USSR continued to follow the policy of acquainting the Soviet people with the best works of world literature and art, including the works of U.S. authors. The works of past and contemporary American authors continue to be published in enormous numbers of copies.

A new stage in the development of these relations began in 1958, when the first Soviet-American agreement in the history of relations between the two countries in the spheres of culture, technology and education was signed. The agreement created an intergovernmental legal basis for exchanges in these spheres by regulating their direction and volume. It is necessary, however, to take into account the fact that the publication and translation of Soviet books in the United States were initiated by American private publishers, but

that initiative depended on a multitude of factors, was not regulated by any plans and was not purposeful. The 1958 agreement was important primarily because it consolidated changes in the political and psychological climate and helped surmount the barrier of hostility and estrangement that had existed in the United States in relation to any contacts with the Soviet Union. Right up to the second half of the 1970's, especially during the period of detente, the Americans were able to acquaint themselves with Soviet achievements in prose, poetry, music, painting, the ballet, the circus, theater arts and so forth. Of course, the ideological opposition continued during those years and it did affect the cultural exchange, which, however, had never before been as considerable or successful as it was during that period. Despite all of the complications of the conditions of these relations and their contradictory nature, they contributed to trust and mutual understanding and promoted a better mutual acquaintance.

The second half of the 1970's marked the beginning of the stage connected with the aggravation of the international situation and the reversal in the policy of the American administration. The intensification of aggression, the adoption of new military programs and the renunciation of many achievements of the period of detente were accompanied by a more rigid American stance in all spheres of American-Soviet relations.

The United States refused to renew the American-Soviet agreement on cultural relations. What is more, it unilaterally broke off the contacts envisaged in the agreement for the 1976-79 period. The rusty hulk of the "cold war" ship was once again afloat, the mass media were spreading the image of the USSR as "enemy No 1" and the American authorities intensified their support to various groups, organizations and individuals preaching anti-Sovietism and a hostile attitude toward the Soviet country. As a result, cultural relations maintained on an official basis were virtually curtailed: Guest tours by artists, the organization of exhibitions and other such undertakings were all stopped.

As further events have demonstrated, however, even under these conditions there is a certain sphere that is relatively less affected by the deforming impact of the American administration's foreign policy line. This is the sphere of exchanges on the level of private firms and social organizations, which have continued to maintain their connections with the USSR by publishing works of fiction, drama, music and the fine arts within the framework of agreements concluded with the All-Union Copyright Agency. Various American firms, publishers, theater societies and copyright agencies act as contractors of the All-Union Copyright Agency. On the one hand, these exchanges are furthered by the aforementioned independence of the private publishing sphere and, on the other, it goes without saying that this sphere is also subject to the impact of current political situations.

It is significant that in recent years anti-Soviet literature containing absolutely deliberate distortions of socialist reality, the socialist way of life and the policy of the Soviet State has been flooding the U.S. book market. But this is not a new phenomenon. Well-known journalist W. Pomeroy has noted that the campaign of slander and lies against the Soviet Union in

the capitalist world and, in particular, in the United States has been going on for many decades. This campaign, Pomeroy has written, is being waged continuously in the capitalist society that strives to prolong its own existence by "trying to portray socialism as an unviable system in which any change for the better would allegedly be impossible."

Therefore, under the present conditions of raging anti-Soviet hysteria and the domination of a "mass culture" diverting the Americans not only from the political and class struggle in their country but also from the path of a correct understanding of the history of Soviet society and of the system of socialism as a whole, it is more important than ever before to use the positive opportunities provided by books as instruments of spiritual exchange between peoples. A truthful book gives an account of Soviet reality, cultural and economic development, the structure of the Soviet society and state and the development of the individual under socialism, and thereby comprehensively reveals the Soviet way of life.

In 1973 the Soviet Union signed the International Copyright Convention, and this event created additional opportunities to expand relations between the two countries, particularly in the publishing field. The press organ of U.S. publishers, the journal PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, has reported that the country "needs to have a clearer picture of its neighbors and adversaries and of its important trade partners in the interest of a solution to the main problem, the problem of keeping the peace." The All-Union Copyright Agency has contracts with more than 70 publishing houses and firms in the United States. Since 1974, scores of agreements on the exchange of literary, musical and theatrical works have been signed between the USSR and the United States.

The interests of the publishing business in the United States are represented by various professional associations of publishers and book merchants, and one of these associations is the Association of American Publishers, with more than 300 publishing firms among its members. The main guidelines of association activities are determined at its annual convention. The association organizes exhibits, seminars and various undertakings for the study of the book market and publishing activities. Its practical work is performed by its secretariat. In contrast to other countries where similar associations limit themselves to professional activities, the American association is also active in politics and often adopts a sharp anti-Soviet position. In the fall of 1978, these publishers essentially wrecked the signing of a protocol on Soviet-American cooperation in the publishing field, initiated by the USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade.

The association leadership maintains close contacts with the U.S. Congress, the White House and the Department of State. In its international context, the association follows the line determined by the Department of State.

It is noteworthy that the association's policy in international affairs is not supported unconditionally by its members. The tendency toward developing relations with the Soviet Union has its followers both among American publishers and among the leaders of the Association of American Publishers. This

position has been adopted primarily by publishing houses which have developed stable relations with Soviet organizations (Times-Mirror, Plenum, and Harper and Row) and participated in the Moscow international book exhibitions and fairs in 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1983. M. Levin, former vice president of the Times-Mirror publishing concern and a well-known publisher, has noted that the American publishers would like to see their Soviet partners paying less attention to press headlines of an anti-Soviet nature and to the association leadership's refusal to sign the joint Soviet-American protocol on cooperation in publishing activities. "All of this is done at the command of the State Department and is of a temporary nature, but American publishers are looking to the future and are interested in cooperating with the Soviet Union."

P. Columbus, chairman of the association's committee for trade with Eastern Europe, also has an optimistic view of future relations with the USSR. He is a regular visitor at the Moscow international book fairs and exhibitions and maintains extensive relations with Soviet publishers.

In an article in PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, M. Levin wrote that "there is the widespread view that contacts between the American and Soviet publishers and authors are allegedly impossible. On the contrary, the All-Union Copyright Agency and the Mezhdunarodnyaya kniga publishing house welcome and promote such contacts." He went on to say: "If you believe that books contain the ideas and information that will promote a better understanding between the two nations, then you must sell them. The viewpoint shared by the diplomats and publishers who have considerable experience in contacts with the USSR is optimistic. They believe that our political differences will be diminished in time and that we will learn to trade successfully with each other and use books as an instrument to accelerate the process of conciliation."

As a result of this position, the Times-Mirror publishing concern has been publishing Soviet books on the fine arts and medicine for a number of years. The Macmillan publishing house has also projected good prospects for cooperation with Soviet publishers and has already published an English translation of the 30-volume edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia.

Articles from Soviet sociopolitical journals are regularly reprinted in the United States. Examples of this kind of cooperation on a steady basis could be multiplied.

It is noteworthy that the Moscow international book fairs and exhibitions have made a major contribution to the expansion of this cooperation. Whereas 73 American publishers participated in the 1977 exhibition (24 of these publishers had their own stands at the exhibition), 150 American publishing firms participated in the 1979 Moscow International Book Fair and Exhibition, at which the Association of American Publishers organized a collective exhibit of 3,200 books.

The trend of maintaining business cooperation will obviously continue to be developed among U.S. publishers regardless of the present objections of certain circles. The recent fairs and exhibitions have produced considerable

results in this connection: Contracts for the publication of a number of works of Soviet fiction and the fine arts were concluded at these fairs and exhibitions. Under the agreements concluded at the exhibitions in conformity with the policy of the All-Union Copyright Agency, the USSR will mainly publish American literary works. It is noteworthy, however, that the failure of the agreement on cultural cooperation and the American Administration's announced unilateral curtailment of cultural relations with the USSR have definitely affected the results of business contacts at the recent book fairs. At the 1981 fair, for example, 11 contracts for the export of Soviet literature and 17 contracts for the import of American literature were signed; the respective numbers of contracts concluded at the 1983 fair were 17 and 19. Furthermore, the majority of the exports involved were works on the fine arts.

The Am-Rus literary agency that promotes the works of Soviet authors in the United States is also connected with Soviet organizations. An agreement envisaging long-term cooperation has been concluded with this agency. In the opinion of the agency's leadership, however, this agreement is being implemented to a minimal extent as a result of the deterioration of Soviet-American relations, the curtailment of publishing plans and so forth. All major projects of cooperation with American publishers in recent years have been carried out mainly without any participation by the Am-Rus agency. On the other hand, the firm is still actively promoting the works of Soviet drama in the United States.

The work with American publishers, however, has not stopped: Agreements with Macmillan, TFH Publications, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich and other firms has been signed in recent years. In particular, the Macmillan publishing house is publishing a series of works of Soviet science fiction (short stories, novellas and novels). So far, 21 hard cover and 11 soft cover anthologies have already been published. More than 20 agreements have been concluded with the Unicover publishing house for the reproduction of original works of art on letter envelopes. Successful cooperation is being developed with TFH Publications in the publication of Soviet literature on music, collections and individual works by Soviet composers. In accordance with a special agreement, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich is selecting works of Soviet literature for publication in the United States. The works of many Soviet authors, books on music and other literature have found their way to the American reader through the efforts of these publishers. There are prospects for cooperation with a number of other large and medium-sized firms in a broad range of literary and artistic subjects.

The All-Union Copyright Agency maintains contacts with the U.S. Copyright Office, the American Society of Composers, the Eugene O'Neill Theater Center and other organizations. Mutual exchanges of delegations of writers, art experts, theater workers and musicians have yielded good results in the sphere of cultural exchange. Many Soviet central publishing organizations (Khudozhestvennaya literatura, Progress, Molodaya gvardiya, Detskaya literatura and others) and literary journals are regularly publishing works of American prose and poetry. In addition, Soviet publishing organizations in various republics are printing them in the languages of the peoples of the USSR. Every year, scores of works by American authors are translated and published.

It is significant that the Soviet reader is much more familiar with American literature than the American reader is with Soviet literature. During the years of Soviet power, more than 7,000 books by American authors have been published in the USSR, whereas a little more than 500 books by Russian and Soviet authors have been published in the United States during the same period. These figures speak for themselves.

Here is another eloquent comparison. The number of book titles by American authors protected by copyrights and published in the USSR in 1980-1982 steadily increased: 24 in 1980, 26 in 1981 and 32 in 1982. In the same years, the publication of works of Soviet literature and the fine arts that formed the main part of contracts for the period declined in the United States: 26 in 1980, 23 in 1981 and 18 in 1982. These comparisons provide further grounds to state that the access of American literature to the Soviet book market has been facilitated and that Soviet publishing organizations have created favorable conditions for this access, whereas the promotion of Soviet literature and the fine arts is being made more and more difficult and is being curtailed as a result of the U.S. Government's policy of discouraging cooperation with the USSR in all spheres.

Scientific and technical literature has an important place in cultural exchange in the field of publishing activities.

American scientists have shown a deep and constant interest in Soviet technical, scientific and socioeconomic literature. The opinion of one American publisher is indicative in this connection. He has remarked that the cooling of intergovernmental relations between the two countries has not affected, and should not affect, the exchange of scientific and technical literature because scientists and scientific workers cannot do without information on the progress of their fields of science in other countries. Plenum Publishing is one of the partners of the All-Union Copyright Agency in the publication of scientific and technical literature. Relations with this publishing house are based on two general agreements, concluded in 1974 and 1979, separately for books and journals. By 1980, Plenum had obtained the translation rights for nearly 200 works from our country, including 10 books by Soviet authors, and had ceded the rights to more than 20 books by American authors. Times-Mirror, Allerton Press, Addison Wesley, Academic Press, Scripta, J. Wiley and Sons, Prentice-Hall, the aforementioned Plenum Publishing and other publishing houses are some of the partners of Soviet publishers in the publication of scientific and technical literature. The participation of these large publishing houses in the Moscow international book fairs and exhibitions and their informative presentation of their products in Moscow were instrumental in informing the Soviet scientific community about the most valuable publications that have appeared in the United States in recent years. Since 1974 the All-Union Copyright Agency has signed more than 1,500 export-import contracts with American partners.

The leading American scientific and technical journals and literature have been published in Russian editions in our country as a result of these contracts. For example, the Academic Press has concluded 17 agreements with the All-Union Copyright Agency on the translation and publication of scientific

documents. The Mir publishing house has obtained the Russian translation and publication rights to seven series of studies by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the journal TOOLS FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH and so forth. The agreements with American firms on the publication of books, articles and anthologies on sociopolitical and socioeconomic subjects are still in effect. Since 1974, around 100 contracts for the export of current Soviet sociopolitical works and more than 170 import contracts have been concluded.

The M. E. Sharp firm is engaged in the publication and representation of sociopolitical journals. Between 1974 and 1980 more than 7,000 articles from scientific and technical periodicals were published in the United States and nearly 2,000 such articles were published in the USSR. Following the conclusion of an agreement in 1976, the All-Union Copyright Agency gave that publishing firm the rights to the selection, English translation and publication of articles from Soviet sociopolitical and scientific periodicals in 14 different journals. The journals SOVIET LITERARY WORKS, SOVIET PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, SOVIET HISTORICAL WORKS, SOVIET EDUCATION, PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS, SOVIET SOCIOLOGY and others are published, and articles from the Soviet journals VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI, VOPROSY PSIKHOLOGII and others are reprinted in the United States. These publications are mainly distributed to subscribers through university and college libraries and research centers. The National Technical Information Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce translates and publishes English editions of topical articles and the Soviet journals KOMMUNIST, SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA and others.

The development of the Soviet-American contacts in the field of publishing activities makes it possible to draw some conclusions.

The fact that the American Administration is trying in every way possible to curtail cultural relations hinders these contacts to a considerable extent. The administration has failed to renew the Soviet-American agreement on cultural cooperation and has broken off many contacts.

The publication of Soviet literature, especially fiction, which carries the heaviest burden of the struggle of ideas, has been significantly curtailed. The Reagan Administration's desire to incite anti-Soviet feelings has also extended to the sphere of culture. This desire has been reflected, in particular, in Vice President G. Bush's scandalously notorious remark that Soviet literature has allegedly given the West nothing. Of course, this approach by members of the American Administration to cultural relations with our country cannot further their development.

The tendency to maintain exchange, however, has been preserved because both sides have shown a constant and deep interest in cultural cooperation and in mutual exchanges of information on achievements in science, literature and the arts. It is precisely this that determines the activities of the American book publishing companies, activities that have continued even under the present difficult conditions.

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98TH CONGRESS: DEBATES ON ARMAMENTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 84
(signed to press 18 Oct 84) pp 85-89

[Article by V. I. Batyuk]

[Text] In general, the Reagan Administration's efforts to achieve military superiority to the Soviet Union have won congressional approval. Congress approved the allocation of funds for the major strategic arms buildup programs and appropriations for the production of the Pershing II and cruise missiles. Congress approved purchases of virtually all the weapons requested by the Pentagon, although in slight reduced quantities, and the military budget as a whole increased by almost 18 billion dollars in fiscal year 1984¹ and will reach the colossal sum of 293 billion dollars in 1985.²

Congress approved several ill-intentioned anti-Soviet resolutions connected with Reagan's announced "crusade" against socialism (in particular, the anti-Soviet resolution regarding the Soviet Baltic republics).³

But these were not easy "victories" for the White House. The passage of the House resolution on a freeze on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons,⁴ the Capitol's refusal to allocate funds for the production of chemical weapons,⁵ the failure of the administration bill in export controls, envisaging a significant increase in restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union⁶--these and some other facts testify to stronger feelings among many legislators in favor of the revision of U.S. policy on Soviet-American relations. Under these conditions, the administration had to engage in maneuvers and accompany its policy of forcible pressure with rethoric about a desire for "dialogue" and better relations with the USSR.

The administration would not have been able to employ this tactic so successfully if some people on Capitol Hill had not supported the continuation of the previous policy of dealing from a position of strength after a few changes, primarily external ones, had been made in this policy. At the beginning of March 1983 a group of moderate conservative congressmen (Republicans and Democrats) submitted a plan in both Houses for changes in the U.S. position at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The plan was that two old warheads should be discarded for each new strategic warhead that is deployed.⁷

This concept of "reduction through buildup" seemed at first to be even more radical than the idea of the nuclear freeze because it envisaged a "reduction" rather than the maintenance of existing stockpiles. According to this plan, however, "reduction" would be impossible without "buildup." This is why the idea of "reduction through buildup" was completely acceptable to the Reagan Administration, which did not expect the talk about "reduction" to impede the buildup of American strategic forces. The supporters of this idea in the Congress agreed with members of the administration that the allocation of the funds requested by the White House for the production of the MX, Pershing II and cruise missiles would "motivate" the USSR to accept American terms in START.⁸

The deployment of these missiles in Western Europe, however, led to the cessation of the Geneva talks. Long before this happened, many sensible congressmen were warning their colleagues who were inclined to use the MX and other nuclear systems as a "bargaining point" with the USSR that this approach would cause the talks to fail. Senator E. Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts) said, for example: "The MX missile represents the threat of a first strike to the Soviet Union...and the Soviet Union will not stand by and do nothing while the United States is producing the MX missiles." He went on to say: "The administration seems to be using the MX more as a bargaining point with the Congress than with the Soviets" because the President "will consider questions of arms control tomorrow, but he is building the MX missile today."⁹

The concept of "reduction through buildup" was supported not only by "hawks" who quickly disguised themselves as "doves," but also by many congressmen who want to curb the nuclear arms race (9 of the 45 senators who supported this idea voted for the nuclear freeze).¹⁰ This was completely in line with the administration's wishes because it diminishes the appeal of the proposed freeze.

Hearings on Soviet-American relations were held on 15 and 16 June 1983 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They were attended by committee Chairman C. Percy (Republican, Illinois) and influential committee members A. Cranston (Democrat, California), J. Glenn (Democrat, Ohio), N. Kassebaum (Republican, Kansas), P. Tsongas (Democrat, Massachusetts), L. Pressler (Republican, South Dakota) and J. Helms (Republican, North Carolina). The administration was represented by Secretary of State G. Shultz. Other speakers were such famous figures as A. Harriman, T. Watson and G. Kennan (all of them were U.S. ambassadors to the USSR at different times).

Opening the hearings, C. Percy said: "Our own interests demand interaction with the Soviet Union in a broad range of issues.... People everywhere, including our own citizens, are hoping that we will reduce the danger posed by nuclear weapons in the world."¹¹

In reference to Reagan Administration policy in the sphere of Soviet-American relations, the committee chairman said: "In my opinion, the danger we are facing today is much greater than it was two and a half years ago, at the start of the current administration." He asked G. Shultz: "In your opinion, in

which direction could American-Soviet relations evolve in the 1980's? How much worse can they get? Can they improve substantially? To what extent is the United States able to influence Soviet policy? How can arms control agreements curb the arms race and improve the stability of U.S.-USSR relations?"¹²

This approach naturally disillusioned the American politicians who realized all of the negative implications of this policy line. A. Cranston resolutely objected to the secretary of state's remark that "although arms control is important in itself, it cannot and should not be the main topic of our dialogue with the Soviets." "I believe," the senator stressed, "that arms control is the most important issue because it is a way of confining the disagreements we might have (with the Soviet Union--V. B.) and assuring that they will not lead to a nuclear conflict." The senator objected to the practice of calling the USSR the "center of evil" in the world: "I do not think that rhetoric of this kind and the saber-rattling that sometimes accompanies this kind of rhetoric...promotes dialogue capable of leading to mutual understanding. I do not know how we can negotiate effectively with them (the Soviet Union--B. V.) if we cannot put ourselves in their place and look at the world through their eyes."¹³

Turning to regional problems, A. Cranston disagreed with the main statements in G. Shultz' report on this topic: "I believe that we should not always regard communism as the only source of all possible evils.... The problems in Latin America did not start in Moscow or Havana. They consist in poverty, degradation and the violation of human rights by rightwing dictators." The practice of saying nothing about these violations while discussing the "problem of human rights" in the Soviet Union is a practice of resorting to "hypocritical double standards which raise questions about the sincerity of our protests about violations of freedom and democracy."¹⁴

Senator L. Pressler cited the findings of specialists from the Livermore Laboratory to refute the allegations that the Soviet Union is not abiding by the terms of the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests, the treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the protocol to this treaty, which were not ratified through the fault of the American side. Stressing that the control measures envisaged in both agreements have certain flaws, he made the valid comment: "We should try to improve the agreements on the limitation of nuclear tests. But if we do not ratify these treaties now, we cannot move ahead to better agreements."¹⁵

Senator J. Glenn, who spoke at the end of the first day of hearings and expressed his feelings about the Reagan Administration's approach to the Soviet Union, used the traditional American political cliches about Soviet "aggression." He also said, however, that "American policy toward the Soviet Union suffers from a severe form of schizophrenia. First the President tells us that the Soviet system is weak and is on the verge of collapse, and then he issues sinister warnings about the mounting Soviet threat. First the administration talks about peace and the need for arms control talks, and then we hear threats about preparations for war in Central America.... First we hear that our allies are being 'punished' for selling equipment to the

Russians for their gasline, and the next day the administration announces the sale of a million tons of American grain to the Soviet Union." Turning to G. Shultz, Glenn said: "Mr. Secretary, many people in our country who look back at the results of the past 2 years feel that the administration has a tendency to confuse belligerence with firmness and bombastic rhetoric with serious discussion."¹⁶

Former U.S. Ambassadors to the USSR A. Harriman, T. Watson and G. Kennan expressed their worries about the state of American-Soviet relations. Acknowledging the importance of the problems separating the two countries, A. Harriman said that "there is no prospect for a compromise between us and the Kremlin in the ideological sphere, but we must find a way of resolving as many conflicts as possible so that we can live together on this small planet without war."¹⁷ The results of the Reagan Administration's policy in relations with the USSR were pointedly criticized by Watson: "The significance of arms control has declined dramatically. Unratified treaties which have been observed to date by both sides are on the verge of collapse. Treaties which have been in effect for a long time, making the world a little bit safer, are being questioned."¹⁸

The results of the hearings, particularly the remarks of the secretary of state, showed the Americans that the White House's approach to the entire range of Soviet-American relations and to the problem of nuclear arms limitation has essentially undergone no changes. But moderate conservatives in the Congress, as observers pointed out, were more concerned about how support for this policy might be portrayed to the best advantage to voters.¹⁹ They ultimately supported Reagan's plans for "strategic modernization," as a result of which, as Congressman L. AuCoin (Democrat, Oregon) sarcastically remarked, "the President received the MX, and the Congress received a declaration of a sincere desire for arms control."²⁰

The "build-down" initiative, which the administration put at the basis of its START position as a result of "pressure" from the Capitol, has been portrayed as something just short of a peacemaking move, particularly in contrast to the positions of such extreme conservatives as Senator J. Helms, who actually proposed the complete refusal to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the grounds that there "is no reason to believe that they (the USSR--V. B.) will not try to bypass or violate the START agreement."²¹ Senator Helms did not confine himself just to this remark.

Finally, the demagogic approach reflected in the "build-down" concept helped the conservatives in their efforts to secure the congressional rejection of several proposals with the genuine aim of curbing the arms race. For example, the resolution introduced by E. Kennedy on the freeze on Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals was rejected by the Senate.²² Besides this, the attempts of a group of members of the House of Representatives and senators to prevent the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in several West European countries failed.²³

The cessation of the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe through the fault of the American side and the Soviet Union's retaliatory

measures to safeguard its security and the security of its allies pointed up the illusory nature of the hopes lying at the basis of the "build-down" concept, the hopes that the White House would take a "conscientious" approach to Soviet-American talks.

Here is what Senator C. Mathias (Republican, Maryland) wrote in the WASHINGTON POST: "Last year I voted to grant President Reagan's request for funds for the development and production of MX missiles. My position on the matter largely reflected my personal great trust in the chairman and members of the Commission on Strategic Forces" (the Scowcroft Commission;²⁴ its recommendations effectively approved and developed the premises of the "build-down" concept--V. B.). "I voted for the MX. The missile began to be produced. But the other part of the bargain was not kept. Very little flexibility was displayed in the sphere of arms control and arms limitation. The administration must keep its part of the bargain. If it does not do this, the next ballot in the Senate might put an end to the MX."²⁵

The dissatisfaction of many congressmen with the White House's position on the START negotiations in Geneva also affected the results of debates on the military budget for fiscal year 1985. The House of Representatives allocated funds for the production of 15 MX missiles, and not the 40 requested by the Pentagon, but even these funds, according to a House resolution, will be frozen until 1 April 1985; after this time, the financing of the program can begin only after Congress passes a special resolution.²⁶ The Senate decided to allocate funds for the production of 21 missiles, but even there the passage of a resolution on a year-long moratorium on MX production was prevented only by the vote of the U.S. vice-president, who is the chairman of the Senate.²⁷ Although both houses allocated funds for research and development for the purpose of creating a broad-scale ABM system with space-based elements and an antisatellite weapon, both the House and the Senate made this conditional upon the administration's commencement of talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of the arms race in space.²⁸

To conceal the plans for the militarization of space, members of the administration, particularly G. Shultz, assured the congressmen of their willingness to accept the Soviet Union's proposal of 29 June on talks aimed at preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space. Regardless of how far these assurances might have been from the truth, they helped the White House fool some congressmen and obtain appropriations for the development of new types of weapons.²⁹ For example, Congress approved the allocation of funds for all "strategic modernization" programs, but the Senate requested President Reagan to resume the talks broken off by Washington with the USSR and Great Britain on the total and universal prohibition of nuclear tests and asked him to submit the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to the Senate for ratification.

In view of the American public's increasing worries about the escalation of international tension, which certainly affects the position of congressmen in an election year, the administration can regard the congressional approval of its main military programs as a victory.

The results of the discussion of various aspects of Soviet-American relations by the 98th Congress indicate that sensible opinions, such as W. Proxmire's (Democrat, Wisconsin) belief that "the strict and comprehensive limitation of nuclear weapons is the only road to peace and survival" in the nuclear age,³⁰ are still not supported by the majority. Anti-Soviet blinders are still keeping many legislators from giving up the illusion that negotiations with the Soviet Union can be conducted from a position of strength. This kind of illusion can only complicate the development of Soviet-American relations.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more detail, see Yu. A. Ivanov, "The 1984 Military Budget: A Dangerous Record," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 4.
2. THE WASHINGTON POST, 25 July 1984.
3. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 17 November 1983, p S16741; 18 November 1983, p H10430.
4. Ibid., 4 May 1983, p H2661.
5. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT (hereafter called CQWR), 19 November 1983, p 2410.
6. THE WASHINGTON POST, 12 November 1983.
7. CQWR, 19 March 1983, pp 547-548; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 22 March 1983.
8. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 22 June 1983.
9. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 25 May 1983, pp S7423-7424.
10. THE WASHINGTON POST, 6 October 1983.
11. "United States-Soviet Relations. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 98th Congress, 1st Session, pt 1, 15-16 June 1983," Wash., 1983, p 2.
12. Ibid., p 3.
13. Ibid., pp 32-33.
14. Ibid., p 34.
15. Ibid., pp 66-67.
16. Ibid., p 41.
17. Ibid., p 47.

18. Ibid., p 61.
19. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 6 October 1983.
20. THE WASHINGTON POST, 6 October 1983.
21. "United States-Soviet Relations. Hearings....," p 28.
22. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 31 October 1983, pp S15007-15015.
23. CQWR, 19 November 1983, p 2462.
24. For more about the Scowcroft Commission, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 10, pp 119-124.
25. THE WASHINGTON POST, 21 June 1984.
26. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 16 May 1984, pp H3995, H4045-H4046.
27. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 16-17 May 1984.
28. Ibid., 14 May 1984.
29. THE WASHINGTON POST, 27 July 1984.
30. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 7 March 1984, p S2381.

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SPACE PILOTED STATION PROJECT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 84 (signed to press 18 Oct 84) pp 96-103

[Article by G. S. Khozin]

[Text] In his State of the Union message to the Congress on 25 January 1984, the head of the Republican administration asked the American people to unite their efforts in the attainment of several "great aims," including the development of a permanent piloted space station in the 1990's.

In accordance with the clearly propagandistic stereotype praising American efforts to reach "new frontiers," President Reagan prefaced his general description of this new and costly space project with the purely declarative statement that economic prosperity requires "sweeping commercial initiative and creative enthusiasm."¹

How many times has the head of the Washington administration substantiated the need for a new and complex space project with political interests and considerations of prestige instead of scientific and technical interests? Once again, foreign policy requirements, the development of private enterprise, broader cooperation by only the leading capitalist states and the improvement of military potential are assigned priority. Three days after the decision to give the green light to the orbital station project was reported, the President devoted his Saturday radio broadcast to this subject. Appealing to American national pride, he declared that the United States should make a new breakthrough in space to uphold the prestige of the "nation of hope and great opportunities."

The President defined the Republican administration's approach to space programs, singling out three main elements. The first was the creation of a space station, which will be permanently manned and will be put in orbit near the earth in 10 years. The second was the further development of international cooperation in space--naturally, according to American wishes and with the aim of influencing partners in joint projects.

Finally, the third aim of the Republican administration was the creation of favorable conditions for the rapid commencement of American industrial activity in space. In the hope of increased private capital investments in coming

years, the administration has promised to give companies interested in putting payloads in space an opportunity to launch their vehicles.

The final words of Reagan's radio broadcast unequivocally testify that the decision to develop the orbital station, the arguments used to support this decision and the "emotional packaging" of the new initiative were borrowed from the recent past, when America "clenched its teeth and tightened its belt" to begin the race to the moon, a race in which there were no other contestants.

Bombastic statements are supposed to conceal the intention of aerospace corporations to increase their profits by expanding activity in space, the plans of the military establishment to turn outer space into an arena of combat operations and an arms race, and the desire to coordinate the U.S. space program more closely with an aggressive foreign policy and various types of propaganda campaigns and ideological subversive activities. The taxpayer will have to pay for all of this.

The idea of creating a manned station is not new in itself. It is much older than the history of world space travel. The idea was expressed in its fullest form in the works of K. E. Tsiolkovskiy, especially such works as "Raketa v kosmicheskoye prostranstvo" [Rocket to Outer Space] and "Zhizn' v mezhzvezdnoy srede" [Intergalactic Life] and his science fiction works "Grezy o zemle i nebe" [Dreams About Earth and Sky] and "Na Veste" [On Vesta].

In the United States the first project involving an orbital laboratory, although it would have visiting crews rather than a permanent staff, was worked on in the middle of the 1960's, when the military establishment was interested in the "MOL" project--a manned orbital laboratory for military use. Various types of applied military experiments were to be conducted on board the station--from surveillance and other types of reconnaissance for the Pentagon to the development of techniques and methods to approach, inspect and destroy other objects in space. The "MOL" project was cancelled after over 1.5 billion dollars had been spent on it because it could not compete with the "Apollo" project, which had already reached the stage of lunar flight by that time.

In 1969 the director of NASA made the following proposal: "Our government should concentrate its efforts in the field of manned flights in the next decade on the development and operation of a permanent space station. This would be an orbiting national research center where scientists in many fields could, for a fee, conduct research and other activities which cannot be performed effectively on earth."² Although NASA stated that this proposal was the result of many years of investigation of the possibility of a permanent manned orbital station, investigation which began in the mid-1950's, before any vehicle had been launched into space, Congress nevertheless decided to assign priority to the space shuttle project. It was not until 1984 that the Reagan Administration decided that the time had come to begin the work on the space station.

Let us look at the technical features of the plan for the permanent piloted station. According to the well-informed weekly AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, the orbital station, which should be ready for use at the

beginning of the 1990's, will be a prefabricated structure with a total weight of around 35,800 kilograms and an interior measuring 195 cubic meters. Additional modules, which could subsequently be attached to the station before the year 2000, could bring the weight of the orbital structure up to 90,736 kilograms and the interior area up to 365 cubic meters.³ For the sake of comparison, we should note that the last figure is six times as great as the interior of the Skylab orbital station, where three expeditions of American astronauts stopped at the beginning of the 1970's.

According to the estimates of a special project analysis group, the station's "central" elements will be orbital compartments to which facilities for experiments and for production operations can be attached. Besides this, "free-flight" platforms with scientific equipment are to be located close to the station. One of the most important functional features of the station is the ability to serve these platforms, located at varying distances from it, such as one with orbital telescopes for transatmospheric astronomical observations. Remote-control devices will be installed on the station for this purpose, as well as manned and unmanned shuttles to maintain contact with other vehicles located relatively close to the station. The station's external geometric dimensions will depend on the choice of various types of auxiliary compartments. The main structural elements envisaged in the project for inclusion in the station structure are listed in the table.

The first stage of the work on the project should end with the assembly of a manned base in orbit with two experimental compartments: for biological medical research and for the perfection of methods of producing materials in space. A crew of 6-8 people will be on board the station at all times. The cost of the first stage of the project has been estimated at 7.5-9 billion dollars. In fiscal year 1984 NASA requested around 150 million dollars for this work. In all, the station accounts for around 6 percent of all projected NASA R & D allocations for fiscal year 1985 (around 2.4 billion dollars).

The second stage of the project will not be completed any earlier than the year 2000. Four to six new modules will be added to the station. The capacity of power sources on board the base will increase from 60 to 160 kilowatts. The station itself will be furnished with additional equipment, and unmanned platforms for various types of experiments will be situated close to the station in free flight or connected to it by a tie-line. Whereas the manned base, which will begin operating in the 1990's, will perform only a few service operations for satellites in orbit, the perfected space station will repair satellites in space and even take some of them on board.

The equipment on the simple and perfected station models will process 3,000 megabits of information a second. The manned base will begin serving two orbital platforms: one in orbit at a slight incline to the equator for astrophysical experiments and another in a near-polar orbit for studies of earth's natural resources. The perfected space station will operate with several platforms in the equatorial orbit and one in the near-polar orbit.

At the end of the second stage of work on the project, the orbital station will accommodate 12 to 18 people. The estimated cost of the second stage is

at least 12 billion dollars, and the total cost of the project will exceed 20 billion. Some experts, however, have put the actual cost even higher, at up to 30 billion dollars.

The station is supposed to stay in space for around 30 years. Experts from NASA assign it a special place among all of the space equipment developed earlier or being developed now in the United States. In their opinion, it will aid in securing the constant presence of man in space and establish the necessary conditions for the regular and daily use of outer space for scientific research, applied projects and the safeguarding of so-called "national security"--that is, projects connected with the use of space for military purposes. The operation of the permanent orbital station will allow for the more thorough investigation of the comprehensive interaction of men and machines in outer space, the practical use of these research findings and the determination of the main components and operational procedures for the creation of "comprehensive national space potential" and the ways and means of reducing the expenditures and simplifying the equipment connected with man's presence and activity in space.

The working group engaged in the comprehensive analysis of the project has already listed the main experiments slated for the station between 1991 and 2000. Of the 107 projected experiments, 48 will be scientific: 22 in astrophysics, 5 in earth sciences, 10 in solar system studies, 6 in biological medical research, 4 in materials technology and 1 in communications; another 28 experiments are to secure the commercial use of space: 11 in the production of materials in space, 3 in the observation of continents and the world ocean and 14 in communications; another 31 experiments will be connected with the development of new types of technology and equipment: 5 in new materials and structures, 3 in energy conversion, 4 in electronic equipment and computers, 2 in propeller equipment, 5 in control operations and the interaction of man and machine, 8 in the structure and operation of orbital station systems and 4 in the physical properties of liquids and heat.⁴

Private businesses have actively supported the project. More than 100 commercial firms were surveyed by NASA, and many of them expressed an interest in obtaining access to the station with the aim of technical "breakthroughs" in business, leading to the discovery of absolutely unique production processes possible only under the conditions of space flight. They include the production of 100-percent insulated synthetic spherical structures, regarded as a qualitative improvement in construction methods. The influential duPont chemical corporation intends to organize the production of catalytic materials in space. The John Deere firm plans to develop graphite and metal alloy compounds in space. Celanese hopes to begin the production of new types of plastic in orbit. The Johnson & Johnson pharmaceutical firm has already conducted experiments with electrophoresis on the space shuttle. This method will allow for the organization of technological operations for the production of supersterile medicines on board the orbital station. Many industrial corporations which have never displayed any previous interest in space activity have expressed the same intention to use the facilities of the station: the Aluminum Company of America, Honeywell, Eli Lilly, 3M and others. Industrial corporations specializing in specific aspects of the commercial use

of outer space have recently made their appearance in the United States. They include Aeros Data, Astrospace, Ecosystems International, Fidex Spacetrain, Orbital Systems and Spacewatch.

Basic Components of Orbital Station

<u>Manned base</u>	<u>Additional elements (compartments)</u>	<u>Means of communi- cation with base</u>	<u>Unmanned platforms</u>
Living compartment	For experiments	Space walks by astronauts	For astronomical observations
Service compartment	For supplies and equipment storage	Remote-control equipment	For observations of earth's surface
Compartment for experiments and production operations	For interorbital vehicle landings	Tie-line connection	For experiments with micro- gravity
Connecting structure		Interorbital vehicle	For other experi- ments, produc- tion operations

Compiled according to data in "NASA Space Station Activities...", p 19.

Back in 1982 the congressional Office of Technology Assessment prepared a detailed report on "Civilian Space Policy and Applications," admitting that "there is still no agreement about the possible scales and fields of civilian space activity in the future."⁵

During the interval between the publication of the report and the decision to start work on the station project, the Reagan Administration took several steps to involve private businesses more extensively in the development and operation of space equipment. In particular, the administration's intention to sell weather satellites built and launched by federal agencies to private corporations was announced in 1983. In October 1983 a special report on the "commercialization" of space was submitted to the House Committee on Science and Technology. It summarized the views of the administrators of NASA, other federal agencies and large corporations on the terms of the leasing of space equipment and other forms of its commercial use.⁶

In February 1984, at a ceremony marking the signing of the executive order on launch vehicles, President Reagan reported plans for the maximum encouragement of private business activity in space. The order assigned the Department of Transportation the responsibility of "stimulating and coordinating" the development and launching of commercial vehicles by private firms and of assisting private business in this area. Officially, all of this was done to establish a new and important branch of industry, the space branch, in the United States.

The desire to stimulate business activity was far from the only motive by which the Republican administration was guided when it "welcomed" the station project. Other far-reaching plans also became evident: The administration hopes to unite the leading West European countries, Japan and Canada under the "American flag" in space if it cannot do this on earth. This was precisely the reason for the extraordinarily full schedule of the NASA director in March 1984, when he toured London, Rome, Bonn, Paris, Tokyo and Ottawa for the sole purpose of encouraging the maximum participation of these states in the station project.

The discussion of the results of these negotiations should be preceded by a list of NASA's "ground rules" for participation by other countries: Potential participants must realize that the project still does not have final approval; participants (foreign ones) must finance their own activity in connection with the project; the United States will not be bound by any formal agreements or other commitments; the regular exchange of research findings and information will be organized. Although the American side is pretending that the interest of other countries in the project grew "spontaneously," it is obvious that the United States wants to unite the capitalist states with the highest levels of scientific and technical development around itself in the work on the project on unequal terms which the "invited" guests will be unable to change. Furthermore, when the United States involved other countries in the project, it obviously assumed that they would not take any steps on their own in this field because of the high cost and would agree to the partial use of the American space station. This would guarantee U.S. leadership in this field of space activity.

People in the European capitals responded politely to the NASA administrator's cooperation proposals, but they all stressed that the final decision would not be made until after joint consultations by representatives of the European countries invited to take part in the project. The initial amount of Western Europe's anticipated "contribution" was also stipulated--around 2 billion dollars--and NASA hopes to obtain a total of 3-4 billion dollars from abroad over and above the initial cost. In Bonn, the NASA administrator explained that the United States would complete the project by itself "if necessary."

A provisional committee was set up in Japan back in August 1982 to determine the degree of interest of government agencies and private business in the station project. In Canada studies of the expediency of participation in the project have been conducted jointly by the government and the business community. It is probable that the European Space Agency has displayed the greatest interest in the project. An ESA spokesman announced on 1 March 1984 at hearings before a Senate subcommittee that the ESA is definitely interested in the development of the station and that Western Europe intends to take on at least 10 percent of the cost. The NASA administrator remarked that the United States expects these countries to finance one-fourth of the cost. The degree of engineering and financial participation by the leading capitalist states in the American project is still being debated.

Participation in the project by the military establishment and special services is an issue of fundamental importance. As early as July 1983, the

press organ of the aerospace industry, representing the central element of the U.S. military-industrial complex, implied that the military had some reservations about the project because it could get along with just unmanned space vehicles.⁷ This was immediately followed by a statement by the assistant secretary of the U.S. Air Force, however, in which he listed the studies the Defense Department hopes to undertake during the first stage of work on the project. They include studies of extended stays by man in space; the development of power sources on space vehicles, especially solar batteries; the study of the possibility of increasing the number of operations performed by a teleoperator in orbit; the use of space platforms operating independently of the station and objects connected to the station.⁸ In short, the militarists are acting out the old script written for the space shuttle, progressing from a show of almost total indifference at the beginning to the substantial militarization of the project after it begins.

In January 1984 the WASHINGTON POST reported that the Pentagon and CIA are afraid that they might have to use the space station jointly with NASA and other civilian agencies, and sometimes even with astronauts from other countries. "The Pentagon would prefer to have the station under its own command," newspaper correspondent D. Hoffman concluded.⁹ This is closer to the truth. The administrator of NASA, J. Beggs, said at a press conference in New York that the Defense Department can use the station jointly with NASA or add its own modules to the basic structure.

He also reported in hearings before a congressional subcommittee that considerations of foreign policy and "national security" were thoroughly taken into account during the analysis of the project. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that the orbital station has been assigned a far from secondary place in the Reagan Administration's long-range plans to extend the arms race to outer space.

It is completely obvious that the military establishment and intelligence agencies will constantly have their eye on this new and massive U.S. space project. They are trying to find ways of coordinating the plans for using the station as closely as possible with adventuristic plans for "star wars," espionage and ideological subversive activity in space.

American ruling circles want to use the permanent orbital station for purposes directly related to the improvement of military potential, the support of aggressive actions in various parts of the world and the subversion of equitable and mutually beneficial international cooperation.

The American administration's attempts to depict the limitation and prohibition of space weapons as an insoluble problem and to link it with the resumption of the talks on the limitation of strategic weapons and medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, talks which were cut off through its own fault, are nothing other than actions calculated to slow down the normalization of international affairs and secure favorable conditions for arms race escalation on earth and in space. This is precisely why the United States has refused to put a moratorium on the testing and deployment of space weapons at the beginning of the talks proposed by our country and does not want to work toward the

Soviet-proposed total renunciation of antisatellite systems. Appeals for the actual legalization of an arms race in space can be heard in statements by American officials. The Republican administration is playing a deceptive game with the talks on the prevention of the militarization of space in the hope of delaying these important talks or wrecking them completely.

The decision to start work on the manned orbital laboratory project was made at a time when the American space program underwent the most dramatic shift in its history toward militarization. When the Reagan Administration decided to develop weapon systems for use in space and from space and when it dramatically increased the volume of R & D projects intended to extend the arms race to outer space, it reduced the number of scientific and applied space projects capable of stimulating technological and social progress.

It was precisely in the 1970's, when Soviet-American technological cooperation was developing successfully and when such positive processes as detente and arms limitation were growing stronger in international relations, that the long-range prospects of space travel were widely discussed by scientists. At that time, American scientists enthusiastically discussed various methods of establishing permanent settlements in space, on the moon and on planets, for the beginning of the "migration" of the human race to outer space. The real possibility of curbing the arms race and using the available resources to finance grand constructive projects on earth and in space was an important argument in favor of these plans.

As for our country, its approach to the study and use of space has not changed. This has been reaffirmed several times in numerous statements by Soviet leaders, who have stressed that the Soviet Union is against any kind of arms race, including one in space, and that the peaceful use of space could be of great benefit to people on earth and has therefore become a symbol of grand scientific and technical achievements, while the protection of space against the deployment of weapons there should become an international duty.

Genuine international cooperation by all interested countries on an equal and fair basis is still the high road of space activity. Peace on earth and in outer space is an essential condition for mankind's use of the colossal potential of rapidly developing space equipment. The numerous international flights organized in the USSR and the Soviet-American joint Soyuz-Apollo project are vivid examples of the possibilities inherent in international cooperation in space.

FOOTNOTES

1. CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, March 1984, p 66.
2. "NASA Space Station Activities. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology. U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session," Wash., 1983, p 1.

3. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 25 July 1983, p 18.
4. "NASA Space Station Activities," p 29.
5. "Civilian Space Policy and Applications. Congress of the United States. Office of Technology Assessment," Wash., 1982, p 4.
6. "Space Commercialization. Committee on Science and Technology. U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session," Wash., October 1983.
7. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 25 July 1983, p 21.
8. Ibid.
9. THE WASHINGTON POST, 18 January 1984.

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8588

CSO: 1803/4

SIPRI PUBLICATION ON DANGERS OF ARMS RACE REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 84 (signed to press 18 Oct 84) pp 113-116

[Review by V. F. Davydov of book "No-First-Use," edited by Frank Blackaby, Jozef Goldblat and Sverre Lodgaard, SIPRI, London and Philadelphia, Taylor and Francis, 1984, IX + 151 pages]

[Text] According to the data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), there are now 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world. This is equivalent to around 7 tons of TNT for each person on earth. And this is not the ceiling in the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction. The MX and Trident programs launched in the United States envisage an additional 2,000 nuclear weapons each year in the second half of the 1980's. The qualitative arms race is also continuing: The speed and accuracy of means of nuclear delivery are being heightened. There are now 5 nuclear powers and around 25 countries with the technical potential to build a nuclear weapon. According to reliable estimates, there will be more than 30 such "near-nuclear" states by the year 2000.

Under these conditions, now that the nuclear arms race threatens to escape control, the question of how the use of such dangerous weapons might be prevented and how life on our planet might be saved must be answered.

After the Soviet Union solemnly pledged not to use nuclear weapons first at the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament in 1982, the question of whether the Soviet example should be followed was the subject of lively debates by politicians and the public in Western countries. Prominent experts on nuclear weapons were invited by SIPRI to summarize the "pros" and "cons" of the no-first-use concept. They include winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982 and Mexico's representative to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament* A. G. Roble, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (U.S.) P. Warnke, French retired General P. Gaullois, prominent Soviet scientist and member of the Palme Commission M. Mil'shteyn (USSR), Professor L. Friedman (England), D. Frei (Switzerland) and others.

The U.S. and NATO military strategy based on the first use of nuclear weapons is "suicidal"--this is the main argument in favor of its fundamental revision.

* In 1984 the Geneva Committee on Disarmament was renamed the Conference on Disarmament--Editor's note.

P. Warnke stresses that the main victims of the American use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would be the populations of allied countries. "In Western Europe," he goes on to say, "administration policy has stimulated a movement which could go beyond demands for no first use all the way to demands for the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe and the refusal of U.S. nuclear guarantees" (pp 126-127).

According to Warnke, the obsession of the supporters of an unrestricted arms race with military superiority and their disregard for the security interests of allies could injure the United States' own interests and lead to serious disagreements with the allies. These considerations, however, are of little concern to those who advocate the continuation of the nuclear arms race and speak of "limited and protracted" nuclear wars. For them the very idea of a no-first-use pledge seems heretical because they feel that the chances of winning a nuclear war are greater if the possibility of a first strike exists. "For the theorists of the extensive use of nuclear weapons, arms control is meaningful only to the degree that it can promote superiority in this area," P. Warnke states (p 125).

West German political scientist H. Aufheld states his views just as definitely: NATO's adherence to first use could result in global catastrophe because there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war. "The strategy of using nuclear weapons first," he writes, "is stimulating a race for nuclear and conventional arms on the local level and is making the conclusion of agreements on strategic nuclear forces impossible. In any case, it can only intensify the confrontations of the two blocs" (p 65).

The idea of the renunciation of first use and the related removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe disturbs the political scientists who still think in terms of the military and political value of these weapons. For example, P. Gaullois believes that this will make NATO's strategy of nuclear deterrence in Europe ineffective and will dramatically heighten the risk of wars involving conventional weapons. "Washington's pledge not to use nuclear weapons first...will make things much easier for the Soviet commander-in-chief" (p 95). Gaullois and L. Friedman mention the alleged imbalance in NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional arms as an argument in support of this view.

In response to these remarks, M. A. Mil'shteyn stresses: "The erroneous belief in the supposed Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional arms has long been present and has been deliberately cultivated in certain Western capitals. This statement is often accepted in the West without any kind of serious analysis or appraisal" (p 119). But after all, Western authorities repeatedly spoke of the existence of an approximate balance between East and West in the sphere of conventional weapons. False rumors about the dramatic intensification of the risk of conventional warfare in Europe after no-first-use has been pledged are being spread all over the West. The socialist countries have repeatedly invited the NATO states, however, to conclude an agreement on no first use of conventional arms as well as nuclear weapons. This proposal has been completely ignored by the United States and its NATO allies.

The opponents of the no-first-use pledge also cite another argument: If American nuclear forces are removed from the European continent, Western

Europe will effectively become a nuclear-free zone and this will make it the target of Soviet missiles.

This point of view does not stand up to criticism because the USSR has invariably stressed that it will never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states with no such weapons on their territory. Furthermore, it was the USSR that proposed the conclusion of an international convention on stronger security guarantees for non-nuclear states in 1978. This fact has also been deliberately ignored in the West.

Some of the authors, particularly D. Frei, believe that the revision of NATO nuclear strategy could lead to attempts by West European countries to build their own nuclear weapons. The pledge not to use them first "could stimulate the proliferation of these weapons among the allies after they have lost their security safeguards" (p 81). Statements like these, however, conceal a desire to denigrate or even deny the USSR's peaceful proposals and its appeals for no-first-use pledges. The majority of America's NATO allies have signed the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and are fully determined not to build their own nuclear weapons. Furthermore, as M. A. Mil'shteyn correctly points out, the majority of non-nuclear signatories of the non-proliferation treaty have repeatedly asked the nuclear states for no-first-use pledges. "There is no question that this would strengthen the existing nonproliferation framework" (p 116).

When the arguments of the opponents of no first use look dubious, they reinforce their position with a "trump card": As long as nuclear weapons exist, pledges not to use them are unreliable. Friedman writes: "No solemn promises made in a time of peace can provide guarantees in a time of war.... It would be virtually impossible to draw up combat rules precluding the use of nuclear weapons" (p 68).

In response to these arguments, A. G. Roble stresses that the supporters of this point of view are completely ignoring the significance of international law in the reinforcement of world security. "If we assume that no-first-use pledges will be ignored on the pretext that they are difficult to keep when a war starts, we might as well bury international law as such" (p 104). He says that the majority of UN members annually ask the nuclear powers to make these pledges. "From the moral and political standpoints, it is absolutely intolerable that the survival of the human race depends exclusively on some states' interpretation of security" (p 104).

The editors of the book, headed by F. Blackaby, summarize the debates on no first use. World public opinion and many military experts, they write, are in favor of firm pledges by nuclear states, especially the United States. "We maintain that the right to self-defense is not unlimited. It is conditioned by humane considerations, the general principles of international law and specific international treaty commitments" (p 23). There is no military or political justification for the U.S. and NATO adherence to doctrines connected with the first use of nuclear weapons. Their use cannot be justified, regardless of the reasons, because they destroy the population of the warring sides as well as their armed forces and, what is most important, they inflict

irreversible damages on states dependent on the warring sides and neutral countries which are not even involved in the conflict. The doctrine of the first use of nuclear weapons is now being questioned by religious, political and military leaders (p 24).

The editors conclude that NATO's present strategy cannot safeguard the security of Western Europe. In extreme situations, in conflicts, "the United States might not pay attention to the objections of European countries and might resort to nuclear weapons. In essence, the European states will have no right to veto their use. They are not likely to even be consulted" (p 17).

Appealing to the United States and NATO to follow the USSR's example and pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, the editors of the book also stress the need for the "materialization" of these pledges--the removal of nuclear weapons designed for combat from the zone of contact between NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces. They write: "Of course, the first step in this direction should be the withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons from regions adjacent to the East-West border, and then the removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of the European countries having no nuclear weapons of their own" (p 24).

It is also obvious, however, that the editors have fallen into the trap of Western propaganda when they say that the deployment of operational-tactical missiles in the GDR and CSSR in response to the deployment of American Pershing II and cruise missiles on the European continent supposedly "undermines the reliability of the USSR pledge not to use nuclear weapons first" (p 20).

In contrast to the United States and NATO countries, the Soviet Union had a positive reaction to the idea of creating a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe. What is more, the USSR has repeatedly stressed that it is in favor of removing all nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical, from Europe. It is precisely the United States and NATO that are responsible for the dramatic increase in the danger of nuclear war in Europe, which could be neutralized considerably by a general agreement on no first use of nuclear or conventional weapons. Unfortunately, the editors do not want to see the diametrically opposed Soviet and U.S. approaches to European security, although the facts force them to acknowledge the significance of Soviet initiatives.

This book proves that the example the Soviet Union set when it pledged not to use nuclear weapons first is winning increasing recognition in Western countries. In spite of the attempts to discredit this move and to underestimate its importance to international security by those who insist on an arms race, more and more scientists and politicians are beginning to realize that security in the nuclear age will be reliable only if first-strike doctrines are outlawed and if the Western nuclear powers follow the USSR's example. The principal way of eliminating the danger of nuclear war consists in the reduction of nuclear weapons, and not their accumulation, and in firm commitments not to use nuclear weapons first.

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